by
A Sample Author
The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, although not solely a result of rural support, owes much of its past and present success to the participation of the agrarian sector. The history of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) is not only that of an armed struggle against the Somoza dictatorship, but also of struggles by the poor against the deprivation caused by the integration of the agricultural economy into the capitalist world economic system without due regard for the needs of the rural populace. It was rural dwellers who supported the Sandinistas during the earlier stages of the insurrection and it was they who stood to benefit the most from the destruction of the agrarian structure that stood as an obstacle to their emancipation. By the time that the FSLN came to power in 1979, tens of thousands of rural Nicaraguans had died in the violent struggle to commercialize the agricultural sector, countless numbers of their immediate families had needlessly succumbed to the ravages of malnutrition or diseases associated with poverty and an unquantifiable amount of damage had been done to the traditional fabric of their existence. A re-examination of the mechanisms of agrarian change in Nicaragua is therefore necessary to appreciate the contribution of, and long term implications of, peasant participation in the revolution.
The long process of agricultural change in Nicaragua is either viewed as "development," by apologists for the capitalist economic system, or by critics as the exploitation of one social sector by another. Seldom in the literature on Nicaraguan history is the disarticulation of the peasant mode of production treated as a disastrous event in the lives of those who were forced off family or communal lands, and seldom are the social implications of forced migration examined in relation to the diaspora. Consequently, two broad groups of research exist on the transition of Nicaraguan agrarian society. They are divided ideologically and empirically by the rapid collapse of the Somoza dynasty in 1979. Consequently, the historiography of rural Nicaragua falls into one of two streams that fail to offer an adequate discussion of the social dynamic caused by the impoverishment of the rural masses. Much of contemporary Nicaraguan history is divided into pre and post revolutionary periods and the literature available concerning the position of the peasantry in the revolutionary process falls into the same pattern.
Within the pre-revolutionary period, the first subdivision is characterized by the superficial examination of agricultural development using indicators such as the increase of exports or the importation of farm equipment and techniques from advanced industrial societies.(1) The use of statistics such as per capita income, or exports and imports, with no regard for their relationship to the marginalized rural majority, proves to be the most glaring deficiency of such reductionism. The information contained in such statistics is useful but can be misleading when used as an objective determinant of social conditions. Furthermore, certain sectors such as women and the underemployed may not be visible in some studies, and therefore will not be reflected in subsequent analyses. The shortcomings of the reductionist school results in shallow analysis that is inherent in a non-critical perspective of the development policies and objectives of an economic system based on inequity. A less subjective approach using other available indicators of social well being, such as concentration of capital and land, levels of proletarianization, and literacy rates, would enhance this type of research.
Another group of material written before 1979 is that of the critics of "Somocismo", those who opposed the monolithic structure of the dictatorship and who attacked it in very general terms.(2) The main characteristic of the often suppressed publications of the "subversives" was the tendency to focus attention on imperialism and dictatorship, rather than on very specific issues concerning different groups within society.(3) The intense hatred of the mutated capitalist system that existed in Nicaragua before 1979, as well as the need to explain, in very basic terms, the nature of the struggle, consistently hindered the presentation of information. Although factionalism and the specific interests of the producers of "anti-Somocismo" literature, tends to weaken most of the work and reduce its value in the wake of the revolution, a considerable amount of information can be gleaned from the broad attacks on the Somoza dictatorships. A much more important constraint imposed upon those who opposed the Somozas and dared make their displeasure known, was the inaccessibility of data which has since been made available by the new government. Consequently, most pre-revolutionary literature lacks the clarity of vision that the removal of the dynasty has afforded all observers of twentieth-century Nicaraguan history.
Although post-revolutionary writing has been hampered by the destruction of numerous centers of information and the collapse of the infrastructural network necessary to obtain concrete data, it has benefitted from the exposition of the immorality of the Somocista state. However, despite the universal denunciation of the corruption of the former government, divergent ideological approaches have hindered the development of an adequate historiography of the Nicaraguan state. As a direct result of the victory of the Sandinista forces and their subsequent domination of the direction of the state there has resulted an almost complete ideological polarization. Because of the new opportunity for a country in the western hemisphere to develop an independent road to socialism, most of the recent historiography is occupied with the relative merits of individual programs. Both the left-wing and right-wing schools of research that dominate post-revolutionary historiography suffer, to varying degrees, from the constraints that their political perspectives place upon the perception of the changes that have taken place since 1979. For example, even though the Sandinistas are willing to admit tactical and political mistakes, some researchers completely ignore their existence even though the anti-FSLN forces have mounted successful campaigns on the basis of the internal discontent caused by the errors. Conversely, critics over-emphasize the mistakes of the Sandinistas through an equally selective manipulation of issues and events. Between the two poles of thought on the development and success of the Sandinista victory is a broad area within which a comparatively small number of researchers work.(4) Despite the valuable contributions of authors who deal with the revolution from a respectable distance, there are problems associated with their tendency to work within the pre-determined confines of a debate between the Sandinistas and their adversaries. As a result, there are problems with accounts of Nicaraguan history that attempt to avoid the fundamental ideological issues raised by the Sandinista victory, yet operate in the same arena as the people they have so carefully distanced themselves from.
Shirley Christian, Roberto Pastor and Abraham Brumberg are good examples of the anti-Sandinista literature that has come out the United States since the defeat of the dictatorship.(5) Their work, as is common among the critics of the new government, downplays the previous government's blatant disregard for the welfare of its citizens, and concentrates on largely unsubstantiated allegations of abuses that are apparently taking place under the Sandinista government. The content is virtually always descriptive and never offers a critical perspective that is not tempered by an intense hatred for "communism."(6) To this end, the weakness of the writing of the anti-Sandinistas is illustrated by the sources used, such as U.S. government agencies and the mainstream North American press, despite unrestricted access to Nicaraguan sources. In addition, the use of subjective information and the lack of critical analysis is often compounded by the ethnocentric attitudes that authors like Christian and Brumberg use in their approach. When such authors deal with the peasantry they treat the sector with a degree of condescension that does not do justice to the people who suffered the most during the long period of agrarian change. The sole redeeming factor of the work by apologists for the Somozas in Nicaragua is that they voice opinions that can be used to illustrate the economic interests of a privileged few who continue to coordinate attacks against the current government in Managua. Despite the oversimplification of right-wing critics, their analysis is useful in that it can always be used to justify less reactionary positions.
In contrast to the right-wing critics of the Sandinistas is a group of social scientists who provide the largest and most important research on agrarian society in Nicaragua. This category of researchers includes a wide range of scholars who agree and accept the common assumption that Somoza and the forces that created the dynasty were morally and politically bankrupt. A critical point of departure from the right-wing scholarship is the extensive use of the Nicaraguan sources that are available because of the openness of the new government. Both Marxists, like Carlos Vilas or Carmen Diana Deere, and non-Marxists, like Forrest Colburn, are included in this category.(7) The academic level of discussion and debate among these authors is much greater and is more relevant to the understanding of the current problems that face the Nicaraguan people than that which is written by apologists of U.S. foreign policy like Christian and Brumberg. Even though far superior to the reactionary historiography, this group tends to oversimplify the Somoza dictatorship and consequently treats the relations created by 40 years of "Somocismo" too lightly. Quite often authors like Vilas, Deere and Colburn use their work to defend the revolutionary process from the baseless popular criticism of Western press. According to such authors, the United States government's support of counter-revolutionary forces is the greatest obstacle to the success of the Sandinista program. Although it is true that the U.S. sponsored destabilization of the government and economy of Nicaragua does threaten the survival of the Sandinistas, many authors consistently ignore the ingrained social problems that face Nicaragua. Consequently, as a result of over-confidence in the Sandinistas, generated by a repugnance for the dynasty, there is a tendency to emphasize the changes taking place without an adequate illustration of the hurdles that must be overcome.(8) Furthermore, it is often difficult to separate the exuberance of such authors for Nicaragua's opportunity to develop an egalitarian society, from the reality faced by the Sandinistas in their attempt to build a socialist society upon the ruins of half a century of economic chaos.
Another shortcoming of the many authors who are sympathetic toward the FSLN is the general conviction that the revolution was led primarily by the working class. Such inadequacy is understandable given the emphasis of such authors on the incorporation of rural society into capitalist structures and relations, or the creation of a proletariat, and on attempts by the state to control such processes. Consequently. the reinterpretation of Nicaragua's past by a new generation of socialist scholars has tended to be somewhat perfunctory in its perception of rural affairs. It has meant that the countryside has been viewed largely in terms of its functionality to the developing capitalist system, as housing a reserve army of labour, or as exhibiting the scars of underdevelopment and impoverishment. Although such an approach is valid, it has not been accompanied by a search for forms of primary resistance by the rural poor, nor has a serious attempt been made to identify the role of the peasantry within the broader struggle for liberation in Nicaragua since independence. There can be no doubt about the relevance of the working class as participants and as an organizational body within the final push for freedom, however, there is some doubt about the extent to which a group like the peasantry identified with the proletariat of which many authors speak. After all, Nicaragua was an overwhelmingly agrarian society until the last years of the Somoza dictatorship. The fact that relatively few members of rural society were able to subsist solely on the cultivation of a family farm by 1979 and were therefore forced into wage labour does not necessarily lead to an affinity with proletarian ideas. Rather, a question must be raised as to the extent of proletarianism within the mind set of the peasantry. Most authors assume a linear progression from peasant to proletariat in Nicaragua but fail to deal with the question of peasant attitudes influencing the working class. The common denominator that existed in Nicaraguan society was not the proletarian experience so much as it was a peasant heritage. Virtually every member of the working class could claim to have direct social links to the peasantry. The peasantry on the other hand, had personal knowledge of the proletarian experience but remained tied to a rural existence that depended on land for security. Not all peasants had land, but the majority of them desired the security of a family plot. The FSLN has had to recognize the peasant needs and has had to effect an agrarian change program that does not force collectivization. Consequently, an examination of the role played by the peasantry in the development and survival of Sandinism during the twentieth century is justified by the lack of attention paid to rural society in most literature on the Nicaraguan revolution.
In order to deal with the peasantry's problems in post-revolutionary Nicaragua it is important to understand the development of the current agricultural crisis. A synthesis of all available material on the revolutionary struggle can offer important insights into some of the difficulties faced by the Sandinista government in effecting a meaningful agrarian reform. Such an analysis must necessarily include all relevant primary and secondary materials but must also examine the peasantry as central to the history of modern Nicaraguan society. Consequently, reference points are needed in order to understand the condition and function of the peasantry in development of the export oriented agricultural basis of the country's economy.
A primary consideration for a reinterpretation of Nicaraguan history is the devastating social price paid by rural inhabitants for the integration of the agrarian economy into the world capitalist system. The chronic conditions and acute events that accompanied the introduction and expansion of export agricultural practices need to be viewed as precursors to the social disequilibrium that characterized Nicaraguan society in the post-1945 period. If it can be argued that the effects of the change in mode of production in agriculture had disastrous consequences, then it is logical to look for responses to catastrophe among the people most affected by the change. To this end, there is an extensive amount of literature available on the subject of human reaction to disaster. The bulk of the research that has been conducted into the after effects of destruction and dislocation concerns disasters that are brought on by war or nature. However, in recent years a new body of research into the social consequences of sustained disasters which are brought on by socio-economic pressures has surfaced to take the study of human response in new directions.(9)
In the case of the Nicaraguan people in 1979, when more than a century of intense competition for the country's resources came to an explosive ending, the presence of trauma-related symptoms is evident. In the final years of the Somoza dictatorship, unemployment and underemployment affected 55 percent of the country's population.(10) Associated with the economic condition of the majority of Nicaraguans were the exceedingly high levels of mortal disease, infant mortality, illiteracy, violent crime, abandoned families, orphans, prostitution, alcoholism, and other social ills. Most of the statistical information available does not distinguish urban instances of social disequilibrium from those of rural regions. Generally conditions were much worse in the rural areas and the social consequences more profound because of the lack of minimal access to the modern benefits that are supposed to accompany development. Kai Erikson describes such societal problems as evidence of chronic disaster; one that gathers force "slowly and insidiously."(11) The history of agrarian change in Nicaragua was both protracted and particularly destructive to traditional society.
A second consideration in twentieth-century Nicaraguan history arises out of the lengthy debate that exists in Marxist literature concerning the nature of the peasantry and their potential for political action. As a direct result of their historical experience, the Sandinistas were well aware of the need to incorporate the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle and have remained sensitive to the demands that the peasant majority have placed upon the new government. However, a series of contradictions between the role of the state and the role of the peasantry in the aftermath of the revolution have dictated the course of the new government in its dealings with the rural masses. The problems encountered by the Sandinistas can be attributed directly to the historical process that created the conditions for the involvement of the peasantry in the insurrection.
In Nicaragua's case, Lenin's concept of a "Junker" road to capitalist development characterizes the process of transition from a subsistence economy.(12) Large landowners initiated and guided the process of transition, and the pre-capitalist estates were slowly transformed into capitalist enterprises, leaving intact the extensive landholdings and many of the systems formerly used to maintain control over labourers. Accordingly, capitalism matured very slowly and aspects of the pre-capitalist relations of production continued to persist for an indefinite period. Directly related to the gradual transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist relations is the marginalization of the majority of the rural population by depriving them of adequate resources upon which to survive. Nicaragua's history is however slightly different in that the transition occurred much more rapidly then in Lenin's model.
A more relevant discussion of the transformation of Nicaraguan agriculture is that of David Goodman and Michael Redclift who explore the role of agriculture in Latin American development.(13) Their focus is on the contribution of agriculture in the process of capitalist development beginning with a look at European transition before 1900 and comparing it to the more recent capitalization in Latin America. Using two prominent Latin American cases, Brazil and Mexico, the authors establish the distinctions between latent and classical transformations of economies to capitalism. Nicaragua's transition from a colonial economy to near complete integration into the world capitalist system occurred more rapidly and later than in Mexico and Brazil. As a consequence, the analysis of unequal development of various agricultural sectors in two of the most prominent Latin American countries is even more evident in Nicaragua.
The two most important points raised by the authors with respect to the differences in capitalist development, are that transition in countries like Nicaragua is distinct from that of Europe and that individual cases in the "new world" are also clearly distinguishable. In the first instance, the transformation of social relations in Europe is considered to have occurred endogenously, whereas in Latin America, because of its late arrival, it occurs exogenously. Quite simply, the existence of a modern capitalist world economy means that the transition to capitalism is completely different in Nicaragua because of the availability of existing market forces. Finally, within the agricultural sector, the transformation to capitalism in less developed countries must also be considered in relation to the modern urban industrial centers which coexist beside the atrophied rural sector. In Nicaragua, after 1900, one city dominated all commercial and political activity to the detriment of peripheral areas.
The ideological basis for the Sandinista understanding of the development of capitalism and the role of the rural masses appears to draw upon the transition described by Lenin. However, Lenin's depiction fails to adequately deal with the need to distinguish among the varieties of peasants and proletarians that accompany an incomplete transition to capitalism. Beginning in the 1950s, a long debate over the identity and composition of the peasantry began among scholars such as Eric Wolf.(14) At various intervals since then, the debate has intensified and subsided with no universally applicable definition arising. In Nicaragua's case, a flexible definition is desirable for two reasons. In the first instance, agrarian change in Nicaragua gained momentum over a period of time and within the context of an expanding frontier, so that a history of vacillation between peasant and proletariat was commonplace. Secondly, in more recent years there was a rapid acceleration of the process accompanied by a curtailment of the possibility for geographical expansion. Consequently, the historical development of Nicaraguan rural society defies classification into rigid social groupings. An understanding of the ebb and flow of the rural populace, between peasant and proletarian experiences is essential to the comprehension of the dimensions of the problems faced by the new government in attempting to enact programmes in the countryside.
The nature of the Nicaraguan peasantry must be understood as a function of the country's particular development as a sparsely populated, agricultural exporter on the periphery of the most important markets in the world. Rodolfo Stavenhagen's work on the Latin American peasant illustrates the need for flexible criteria for a discussion of rural society.(15) He identifies several types of peasants which range from those in highland communities with minimal contact with a market economy, to rural dwellers who are tied to commercial plantations, to workers on mechanized plantations whose labour is based on salaried or contractual arrangements. In Nicaragua, every type of peasant that Stavenhagen identifies has been in existence throughout the twentieth century. Furthermore, changing conditions most definitely resulted in the positioning of individuals in more than one category during their productive lives and often simultaneously. Sidney Mintz has argued that although environing factors will determine the extent to which the proletariat can be segregated from a peasantry, the alternating "simultaneous participation of large groups of people in activities associated with each 'type' raises genuine questions about the topology itself." (16)
Associated with the problem of defining a group of people who have fluctuated between organized and unorganized agricultural exploitation, is the issue of primary resistance versus modern mass nationalism. A review of the twentieth century political history of the country reveals a series of attempts by the members of established political parties and the intelligentsia to forge links with the rural masses. The most successful mobilizations against the government have occurred during key periods of economic hardship when episodes of spontaneous rebellion by peasants ensured an otherwise doubtful victory. Augusto Sandino's "pequenio ejercito loco," and his modern counterparts who now govern Managua owe their success to the selfless participation, not to mention sacrifice, of rural Nicaraguans in struggles for justice. The current Nicaraguan government is well aware of the importance of the role played by the rural masses in the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty. They are also cognizant of the continued struggle for a just society even after the assassination of Sandino in 1934, therefore know that the promises of the 1980s must be accompanied by concrete action if the revolutionary gains are not to be reversed by the same people who made them possible.
It is no wonder then that the lengthy debates that surround the development of an acceptable topology for peasants in Latin America are paralleled by equally extensive discussions on the composition of the rural proletariat. Therefore, not only must consideration be given to the point at which a peasant becomes proletarianized, but of equal importance is the movement of individuals from the rural proletariat to a peasant existence. In Nicaragua's case, with one of the lowest population densities in Latin America, the availability of land for the dispossessed has historically made the proletarianization process reversible.(17)
The question that must then be asked of the Sandinistas is whether there is the political will to grant the peasantry the single most import possession for their continued existence. In order to attempt to uncover the answer to such a question it is essential that the context within which the answer must be given be understood. To establish the context that the Nicaraguan government and society find themselves in, a reinterpretation of the development of modern capitalist agriculture must be undertaken. The opening chapter examines Nicaragua's first hundred years of independence and the agricultural changes that initiated the massive expropriation of communal and peasant lands. It is also devoted to the first organized peasant struggle that ended with the establishment of a basis for the rise of the Somoza dictatorship.
When the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) came to power in Nicaragua in 1979, it inherited an atrophied domestic agricultural sector which had persisted despite more than a century of competition for land and resources with an ever expanding agro-export industry. Between 1945 and 1979, domestic food production was incapable of matching the demands of the growing population, while the agricultural export sector grew at a phenomenal rate. The development of an economy, which depends upon agricultural exports, and the resultant impact on the structure of rural society, have proven to be major obstacles to the creation of an egalitarian society in post-revolutionary Nicaragua. In order to understand the difficulties encountered by the new government in effecting agrarian reform and increasing domestic production, it is necessary to examine the roles of both the agro-export sector and the peasantry before the revolution.
Prior to 1979, Nicaragua's agricultural development was based on laissez-faire capitalist ideology which served to limit the social benefits for the country as a whole. To complicate matters, export agricultural production developed primarily along the Pacific coast and generated an unbalanced infrastructural network that intensified the struggle for land. When the Spaniards arrived in present-day Nicaragua they encountered a sizable native population that inhabited the plains and valleys of the western coast. The people who lived in the area practiced subsistence agriculture with a low level of commodity exchange that can be described as procapitalist in nature. The Spanish conquest introduced new economic forces that immediately began to transform the existing political economy of the indigenous population. For the Europeans, survival in the "New World" necessitated the availability of both land and labour in sufficient quantities to guarantee the viability of their agricultural endeavours.
In contrast to the hospitable west coast, the Atlantic seaboard was sparsely populated and physically less attractive to the kind of colonization envisaged by the Spanish settlers. It is hot and humid with a lengthy rainy season that limits the types of sustainable agricultural practices. Furthermore, it is characterized by its rugged terrain and low relief that make the establishment of communication networks difficult. In addition to being physically unattractive the east coast with its tropical environment, was the type of place that the Spanish avoided for health reasons. Higher instances of disease could be expected in areas where rainfall and heat were so abundant. Consequently, it was along the more palatable Pacific coast that the technological and economic advances of the succeeding years would have the most effect on the general populace.
The western coastal plain became dominated by large and medium sized producers who engaged in modern, highly mechanized forms of agriculture, oriented toward the export market. The region is comprised of huge expanses of fertile volcanic plains that receive adequate amounts of rain and a six month dry period. The plain was ideally suited for the livestock, poultry, wheat, rice and assorted vegetables introduced by the Spanish. In addition, it proved highly amenable to the export crops that were cultivated initially and to the twentieth century development of commercial cotton and cattle production. The coastal plain is a narrow strip of land that proved easy to settle and develop the limited infrastructure necessary to facilitate exports to Spain. The area settled by the Spanish and the indigenous peoples before them slopes gently from the upland regions of the interior to the ocean with an altitude change of only a few hundred meters. It proved ideal for the establishment of a network of communities and provided for good communication links between them. Consequently, two cities and the primary port facilities of the country were constructed along the plain where agriculture gradually developed into the main source of export earnings for the country.
Consequently, it was along the Pacific coast that the technological and economic advances of the succeeding years would have the most effect on the general populace. The western coastal plain became dominated by large and medium producers who engaged in modern, highly mechanized forms of agriculture, oriented toward the export market. In contrast, the areas where production was dedicated to internal markets were located in inaccessible parts of the interior where less advanced agricultural methods were practiced. As a result, the small plots in the mountainous central region had very low levels of productivity and existed with a minimal amount of access to larger markets, factors which forced the owners to sell their labour to the export oriented landowners during seasonal harvests. The concentration of the best arable land in the hands of the export sector and the marginalization of domestic producers resulted in the integration of the entire rural populace into commercial agriculture.
Adjacent to the coastal plains are the upland areas that became the centres for coffee production in the late 1800s. Their elevation is less than 1000 meters and the upland areas are a part of the same climatic zones as the plains that stretch below them. The soil is ideally suited to the cultivation of coffee and the altitude tempers the extreme heat of the dry season. The entire area was inhabited at the time of the Spanish arrival but the residents were forced to give way to the expansion of colonial settlement and the introduction of coffee as an export crop during the last century. The northern reaches of the upland area focused on the cities of Matagalpa and Jinotega which were Indian villages that became important commercial centres with the arrival of coffee. The most important region of this nature is the Southern Upland where the capital of Managua was eventually located. It is bordered on northeast Lake Managua and southeast by Lake Nicaragua, jutting out toward the Pacific ocean as a geographical division of the coastal plains.
In contrast to the rich soil along the coast, the areas where production for internal markets existed were gradually pushed towards the more marginal land in inaccessible parts of the interior where less advanced agricultural methods were practiced. Over time, production of domestic products became the responsibility of descendants of the indigenous groups that the Spanish had to dispossess in order to create haciendas and promote export agriculture. As a result of their location, the small plots in the mountainous central region had very low levels of productivity and existed with a minimal amount of access to larger markets, factors which limited the development of capitalistic social relations. However, by the time that Anastasio Somoza began to implement his agricultural programme, the marginalized farmers of the interior had become a large pool of reserve labour and were forced to sell their labour to the export oriented landowners during seasonal harvests. Other peasants who remained on the plains developed a variety of contractual relationships with the owners of large estates and also became participants in the production of agricultural commodities for export. Therefore, it was the concentration of the best arable land in the hands of the export sector and the marginalization of domestic producers that resulted in the integration of the entire rural populace into commercial agriculture. It was also this forced incorporation of small independent producers into a wage system that could not meet their needs and the precarious nature of the landlord/tenant agreements that resulted in continuous and often massive resistance. In general terms, this protracted transformation of Nicaraguan agriculture began in the colonial period, languished during the nineteenth century and accelerated through the twentieth century, leading to a peasant revolution.
The Legacy of Colonialism
As a Spanish colony, Nicaragua developed into an agricultural exporter and an importer of manufactured goods. Huge tracks of land and its inhabitants were doled out to Spanish nationals and the hacienda became the foundation of the new society. The creation of large estates by the Spanish colonizers resulted in the emergence of a pattern of monoculture that continues to characterize the economy of the state. The colonial hacienda served as a political extension of the Spanish crown and devoted its attention to the production of cacao and indigo for the home market. Although small farms have predominated throughout Central America, the economy of the region has depended almost exclusively on the export of agricultural products. The haciendas not only played an important role in the formation of the agricultural export sector but also in the cultivation of paternalistic social relationships between their owners and the people who were required to work the fields. Throughout the colonial period a system developed that guaranteed a minimal subsistence level for the rural poor and a stable labour force for the hacendado.(18)
For 300 years Nicaragua and its neighbours existed as minor concerns in a Spanish Empire that was daily losing its grip on its colonies in the Americas. In Nicaragua, a part of the Audiencia de Guatemala for most of the colonial period, the Catholic Church and latifundists were the dominant figures of authority.(19) The Spanish Crown, although represented in Nicaragua, had more serious matters to contend with than the organization of development in area that represented a small fraction of its colonial holdings. In direct relation to Spain's disinterest in Central America, there was a corresponding lack of interest in the outside world among the residents of Nicaragua. As compared with New Spain and Peru where a more vibrant colonial society emerged to challenge Spanish rule, Nicaragua and Central America were passive in their resistance to colonialism.(20) Consequently, Nicaragua's geographical and political isolation, resulted in the state emerging as a by-product of liberation struggles elsewhere in the Empire and continued to play a role relative to its position before independence.
For more than 150 years there had been a gradual deterioration of the economic base of the majority rural population, which resulted in the proletarianization and semi-proletarianization of 75 percent of the economically active rural population by 1978. At the same time, there was a corresponding concentration of ownership, and expansion of arable land which resulted in the control of 85 percent of land under cultivation by only 5 percent of the economically active agricultural population. (Refer to Appendices I and II for a more concise breakdown of the agricultural economically active population and the distribution of land at the end of the Somoza dynasty). The most blatant example of unrestricted accumulation was the Somoza family's control of more than 20 percent of the country's farm land by the end of their dictatorial rule. Consequently, two principal types of farms existed when Somoza fled the popular insurrection of 1979: the enormous agricultural estates that dominated the economy of the country and a large number of extremely small family plots that could not guarantee subsistence.
An analysis by Philip Warnken demonstrates both the dominance of the export sector and the relative poverty of most rural Nicaraguans.(21) Relying on data from the national census and the Central Bank of Nicaragua he shows that although there were more than five times the number of farms producing basic grain crops in 1971 than were producing export crops, export crops accounted for 49 percent of the total value of production while food crops contributed only 19 percent and livestock 32 percent.(22)Warnken describes the structure of Nicaraguan agricultural crop production as consisting of a small proportion of all producers oriented to the export market and a high proportion of producers oriented to the domestic market.(23) It is the development of this contradiction between the abundance of the export sector amid the abject circumstances of peasant existence that conditioned the participation of the rural poor in the Sandinista revolution. Peasant involvement in the 1979 revolution stems directly from the transformation of the agricultural sector from local subsistence to complete integration into the world market. The protracted transformation of Nicaraguan agriculture was initiated during the colonial period, languished during the nineteenth century and accelerated through the twentieth century.
When the Spaniards retreated from Central America in 1821, they left a weak political and economic structure that hindered Nicaragua's development as an independent nation.(24) A series of attempts at the unification of the five Central American countries were made by those who were left with the task of building an independent destiny for the former colonial provinces. Some observers emphasize the failure to unite in the wake of the Spanish withdrawal as the reason for the subsequent instability and underdevelopment that has characterized Central American history.(25) Other scholars point to the role played by contending imperial powers for the inability of the various heads of Central American states to lead their countries on a stable political and economic course.(26) In both cases economic prosperity and the lack thereof, is presumed to be secondary to political considerations. However, a review of the development of Nicaragua as an agricultural exporter consistently reveals that economics was the most important conditioning factor in political decisions.
Spain had never intended Nicaragua's political, social and economic structure to stand on its own. As a result of a largely unexpected release from colonial bonds, a series of internal and external political contests ensued which were to have a detrimental effect on Nicaragua's post-independence history. Externally, the main contenders for imperial influence over Nicaraguan affairs were the British, whose regional presence decreased substantially by the end of the century, and the United States, which rapidly consolidated its hegemony over all of Latin America. The British did have significant contact with the Miskito coast region of the isthmus during the nineteenth century, but Nicaraguans did not yet exercise control over their present day portion of the region. In 1860 Britain agreed to hand the Miskito Coast over to the Nicaraguan government but took several decades to withdraw completely from the region.(27) On the other hand, the United States actively sought to promote its political, economic and security interests in Latin America. In 1823 the United States announced the Monroe Doctrine and two years later, in 1825, diplomatic recognition was extended to the first union of Central America (known as the United Provinces of Central America).(28) Ostensibly, the Monroe Doctrine held that the countries of Latin America were protected by the United States from any outside threat to their sovereignty. By the end of the century, in light of the British withdrawal, the doctrine had come to mean U.S. dominance over the political and economic affairs of the hemisphere.
In Nicaragua, a relatively insignificant corner of the Spanish empire, no cohesive political opposition to the colonial élite existed at independence. The reasons for the lack of a powerful mercantile, non-traditional élite stem from Nicaragua's relatively underdeveloped infrastructural base combined with its relative isolation within the isthmus. Nicaragua did participate in the attempts to unify the isthmus but political and jurisdictional disputes among the leadership of the five republics prevented a permanent federation from being formed. Shortly after independence, neighbouring countries uniformly rejected the dominance of elites who were mired in colonial traditions and began to reorient their economic activity to take advantage of more dynamic opportunities in world trade. Nicaragua, a country where colonial traditions were deeply rooted, was slow to adapt to the new market forces it encountered after independence and consequently failed to develop a vibrant economic foundation until the late nineteenth century. At mid-century, the stagnant Nicaraguan economy continued to be dependent on the export of indigo and a small amount of live cattle for its export earnings while a new dynamism was unfolding in the economies of surrounding countries. Until 1850, Nicaragua was integrated into world trade primarily as a supplier of natural dyes, however, by mid-century the markets for the country's main exports had been destroyed by the introduction of synthetic substitutes. The collapse of the world market for indigo, the principal source of external income, forced a diversification of the economy on an unwilling traditional élite. In addition to an unimpressive agricultural export sector at the time of independence, the largest part of agricultural activity was subsistent in nature and largely outside the mainstream of political activity. For the most part, Nicaraguans of the nineteenth century lived in isolated hamlets where pre-capitalist economic relations dominated. In addition, whole regions of the country were effectively controlled by powerful land owners who maintained feudalistic land and labour relations with the peasant population. Capitalist economic activities were focused on the two main urban centres, Granada in the south and León in the north. As a result of the atrophied internal economy that could not generate a challenge to the political status quo, no effective opposition to the colonial élite emerged until more than three decades after independence.
Throughout the period of adjustment between Nicaragua's integration with the Spanish colonial empire and the country's ability to operate as an independent player in a global economic system, a series of domestic struggles between competing political forces occurred. By mid-century the stage had been set for a protracted political struggle between rival economic factions. The political strife which characterized the latter half of the century stemmed from antagonisms between two principal groups, the traditional landed élite, who were based in Granada, and a group of modernizing merchant-producers from the city of León. The traditional élite were anti-nationalist and mired in an outdated economic structure that was incapable of meeting the demands of post-colonial society, while the Liberals had established themselves as merchants and were anxious to introduce a new political and economic structure that would allow them to expand their role in the state.
Like the political sphere, the agricultural sector was never united nor uniform in its halting progression through the series of economic catastrophes that have characterized post-independence Nicaraguan development. As elsewhere in Latin America, the large agricultural estates and social relations that were established by the Spanish colonizers played a fundamental role in shaping Nicaragua's post-colonial agrarian structure. During the first decades after independence, the traditional agricultural export sector was challenged politically and economically by the forces of modernization. As a direct result of the traditional élite's unwillingness to change, the Nicaraguan agricultural economy retained vestiges of archaic modes of production while it progressed toward a complete integration into the world capitalist system. Economic antagonisms were accompanied by political differences that clearly separated the traditional élite from their Liberal minded compatriots. In 1855, William Walker, a United States citizen, established a government that was supported by his president in Washington and the merchants of León.(29) In essence, the attempt by Walker to claim Nicaragua for U.S. interests helped to extend the political life of the Conservative oligarchy, and delayed the introduction of economic liberalism. Walker came into Nicaragua with the idea of establishing a white republic and a model slave society in Central America. Nicaragua came under his control for a brief period after he captured Granada with a small entourage of U.S. mercenaries and the support of Nicaraguan Liberals. He elected himself president of Nicaragua in 1856 and was chased out of the country one year later.(30) Of primary importance in the Walker episode is the alliance of the Liberals with a foreign invader for personal economic gains. Walker as invader and president did not have a lasting effect on the country; however, the act of supporting a foreign invasion completely discredited the Liberals and their political platform. The end of Walker's presidency and the simultaneous disgrace of his Nicaraguan supporters, served to retard the introduction of the economic policies that were shaping the economies of neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the continued presence of and threat posed by the Liberals did initiate a half-hearted shift in Nicaragua's agricultural orientation during the subsequent thirty year extension of Conservative rule.
The prolongation of Conservative dominance over the political and economic direction of the state further retarded the already latent Liberal attempts to alter Nicaragua's class structure. The greatest obstacle to the reorientation of the agricultural economy, and the further development of a merchant-producer élite, was the legacy of the colonial period that included social relations that could not meet the needs of an expanded export sector. The Conservative colonial élite, by virtue of their privileged economic and social position, resisted all attempts to subvert their authority. Their extensive agricultural holdings combined with their ability to rely upon feudalistic labour relations hindered all attempts by the rival Liberals to introduce capitalistic agricultural development. In addition, the subsistence economy of the peasant communities was incompatible with the requirements of those who aspired to command the direction of the state and its economy.(31) Consequently, to the modernizing élite the barriers to large scale agricultural production were threefold: the lack of an adequate labour force, the laws that prevented a return to the forced labour of the colonial period, and the effective occupation of the best land by indigenous communities and the traditional élite.
In order to quell internal opposition to their rule, the Conservatives enacted numerous agricultural laws during the latter half of the century. Throughout the post-colonial period, the peasantry consistently resisted encroachments by individuals or government on community lands. Despite their efforts, by 1870 peasant lands were forcibly expropriated to provide land and the labour for the production of coffee.(32) The direct result of the expansion of the cultivated area was the increased alienation of the peasantry from their means of subsistence. Even though the Conservative government clearly indicated its willingness to use force to effect agrarian change, mounting pressure from the merchant-producers dictated the need to strengthen the legal mechanisms for the expropriation of communal lands. Responding to the desires of the new capitalists, in 1877 President Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the leader of the traditional oligarchy, passed a series of laws that specifically attacked the lands occupied by indigenous communities.(33) The first massive resistance to the expropriation of communal lands occurred in 1881 when several indigenous communities rebelled against the pressure placed upon them to conform with the export sector's land and labour requirements. The war between the landed classes and the indigenous communities lasted for nine months during which time cities were attacked by thousands of peasants.(34) The uprising was put down by government forces and resulted in the massacre of 5,000 peasants.(35) However, the attempts by the traditional oligarchy to facilitate land concentration and labour requirements through legal and military means stopped short of providing the incentives that the Liberal merchant-producers wanted in order to significantly expand cultivation for export.
Unlike Nicaragua, where coffee was hesitantly introduced at mid-century, other Central American countries began commercial production of the crop shortly after independence. Consequently, the coffee "boom" and sudden wealth it produced for the cafeteleros, resulted in state power falling into the hands of the non-traditional élite in neighbouring countries. Control of the state by "Liberals" in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala facilitated the privatization of church, government and most importantly, indigenous lands. Nicaragua's neighbours served as examples of both the potential of economic liberalism and the incompatibility of modern social relations with the interests of the traditional oligarchs of Granada. As in other Central American countries, the wealth that coffee produced for the entrepreneurial class would eventually provide means to control the direction of the state.
By the last quarter of the century, coffee became the most important replacement for earlier export commodities. Because of its prominence as an export earner, it received the most attention at home and abroad. So much so that foreign interests played a significant role in the development of the coffee industry. Europeans and North Americans invested heavily in the new crop throughout Central America, however in Nicaragua where land was more readily available, their role was proportionately greater. Initially, foreign interests controlled more production than did Nicaraguan producers.(36) By 1914, coffee was the most important export crop, accounting for 63.3 percent of Nicaragua's total foreign trade.(37)
The ascension of the Liberal regime of General José Santos Zelaya in 1893, and the sixteen year dictatorship that followed, marked the consolidation of power in the hands of the merchants. The new policies that were introduced favored rapid material development through the attraction of foreign capital. As a result, the state deficit increased dramatically under Zelaya due to the needs of the expanding agro-industries and the willingness of the European powers to extend their influence. In addition, the legal apparatus established by former governments was strengthened to enable the cafeteleros to expropriate the previously untouched holdings of individuals and communities in the northern departments of Estella, Matagalpa and Jinotega. A register of civil property was created to identify irregularly farmed small holdings of peasant and Indian communities. In many parts of Nicaragua "slash and burn" agriculture was practiced in the absence of fertilizers and other modern farming methods. Most small cultivators retained pieces of land that were left fallow for a period of years and were therefore technically unused. Consequently, farmers had to justify the occupation of their land and in so doing provided the legal basis for the expropriation of unclaimed lands.(38) The impact of Zelaya and his Liberal ideology is reflected in the production figures that reveal a doubling of coffee output within the first six years of his administration.(39) As a consequence of the liberalization of the economy, the conditions necessary for the development of coffee cultivation on a massive scale were realized by the turn of the century.
Coffee rapidly became the most important export earner for the latifundists. It provided for Nicaragua's belated introduction into a world capitalist market that was undergoing extensive reorganization, owing to rivalries among the industrialized nations of the period. Nicaraguan agriculture had continued to center primarily around large coffee and cattle latifundios. Unlike other Central American countries, Nicaragua did not evolve into a major producer of bananas and the rural labour movement remained relatively unorganized due to the seasonal and unstable nature of existing agricultural employment. Organized labour in the rural areas was limited to industries like mining or plantations that required a year round labour force. However, both the mining industry and classic forms of plantation agriculture declined in inverse proportion to the ascension of coffee, beef and later cotton as primary export commodities.
Although the cultivation of bananas for export did account for half of Nicaragua's exports by 1930, it was incapable of replacing coffee as the most important export earner. In spite of the attempts of multinational fruit companies, Nicaragua, unlike its neighbours, did not have extensive enclaves of U.S. owned plantations. Even though the total area of land owned by North American fruit companies did amount to 655,000 acres during the first quarter of the twentieth-century, only a fraction was brought into production.(40) Despite the fact that exports in 1929 were at a record level of over 4,000,000 bunches, Nicaraguan exports were generally far less significant than those of its Central American competitors.(41) The fruit company and railroad combination that had accounted for the domination of foreign interests in other countries did not evolve in quite the same manner in Nicaragua. One reason for the failure of the four major fruit companies that were in the country was their inability to secure the conditions which they wanted from the government.(42) In addition to the government's intransigence, banana plantations were confined to the Miskito Coast where a severe labour shortage and the lack of a coercive means to bind workers to the plantations hampered their development.
The Miskito Indians who inhabited the area were fiercely independent and were also difficult to pressure into service because of the nature of their existence. Their communities functioned independently and were largely outside the sphere of effective control of the governments that came and went on the Pacific coast. During the nineteenth century the natives of the Atlantic coast had more contact with the British than with the Hispanic population on the other side of the jungles and mountains. In addition, they lived in a large, sparsely populated region that was generally outside of the market economy. As a result, the people of the Miskito Coast were less vulnerable to the encroachment of wage labour.
Despite the difficulties of establishing on the Miskito Coast, the fruit companies persisted and did manage to develop into a significant player among national export producers. However, events beyond the control of the banana producers served to permanently reduce their presence in the economy. In the 1930s, diseases destroyed the Atlantic coast plantations, thereafter reducing the crop to a negligible export.(43) In addition to the famous blight that affected all of the Central American banana crops in the 1930s, Nicaraguan producers faced another obstacle that made their country particularly unattractive. The U.S. owned east coast plantations became primary targets during the guerrilla offensive that raged throughout the countryside between 1927 and 1934. Whereas the president of the United Fruit Company was able to declare in 1927 that his company had "never had to call for a warship," four years later, the Standard Fruit and Steamship Corporation telegraphed the White House and pleaded for military protection.(44) The combination of war and disease effectively curtailed the activities of large U.S. fruit companies in Nicaragua causing them to concentrate on neighbouring countries.
In contrast to the limited social impact of banana cultivation, the rise of coffee as the primary source of external revenue in the twentieth century resulted in a growing population of peasants who were unable to obtain land and were increasingly unable to augment their meager subsistence with wage labour in the commercial agricultural sector. Gradually, small and medium sized producers of coffee lost their farms to merchant-proprietors, or their political and economic rivals - the landed oligarchy. The dispossessed either moved to the sparsely populated regions of the country or into towns and villages where they would compete for employment in the agricultural or service sectors. The pace at which the displacement of the small independent producers occurred began to accelerate between 1900 and 1930. The push toward the consolidation of small farms into coffee estates came as a result of competition in the market place that required the modernization of the industry. During the early part of the twentieth century, modernization meant the expansion of the area under cultivation in order to benefit from the economy of scale. Consistently low coffee prices, combined with the difficulties caused by the underdeveloped infrastructural base of the country, meant that the small producers were unable to compete with the latifundists on an equal level. By 1920, and especially during the crisis of the 1930s when the world economy was in shambles, the minifundistas were forced to market their produce through merchant-producers. Depressed world markets translated into loans negotiated on future sales by petty-producers who used their land as collateral. Prices remained depressed for several years and the consequence for the minifundistas was impoverishment and the eventual loss of their means of subsistence.(45)
Zelaya's efforts to secure a future for the interests he represented required an expansion of Nicaragua's export market and infusions of foreign capital. The president's attempts to expand Nicaragua's export capacity ignored protocol by attracting investment from economic rivals of the United States. He contracted a loan from British financiers for the construction of a railway and initiated negotiations with Germany and Japan for the construction of a canal to rival that being built by the United States in Panama.(46) As a result, the United States saw Zelaya as a threat to its economic interests in Central America and to the political stability of the entire Caribbean Basin.
The U.S. justification for its dominance of politics in the Americas was predicated on the Monroe Doctrine which had been advanced in the previous century. As a consequence, the United States intervened in Nicaragua's domestic affairs. In 1909, a few hundred marines landed at Bluefields to support a Conservative "revolution" which one observer characterizes as leading to "twenty-five years of chaos."(47) Zelaya's government collapsed, making way for a less antagonistic and more submissive government led by retrogressive Conservatives who restrained the modernization process initiated under the Liberals. In 1912, the Liberal's "counter-revolutionary" efforts were met by an even larger contingent of U.S. marines who guaranteed the further perpetuation of Conservative rule. During the period between the Conservative revolution in 1912 and the Somoza dynasty in 1933 the U.S. marines occupied the country for all except one year. However, despite a well organized effort by the United States to establish its hegemonic control over the state and economy, a new and unexpected force emerged to challenge the North American presence. Caught within the political struggle between the élite classes were of course legions of impoverished rural dwellers. Conservative rule and U.S. occupation, combined with the pressure applied on the peasantry to conform with the bourgeoisie's desire to increase Nicaragua's share of world markets, created the conditions for a popular insurrection.
Resistance to the North American presence was frequent and widespread. Between 1913 and 1924 no less than ten important armed attempts by the Liberals to overthrow the Conservative government took place.(48) Most occurred outside of the capital and resulted in the fierce repression of all suspected supporters. Rural Nicaraguans had to contend with three fighting forces and a multitude of individuals who roamed the countryside demanding assistance and in the process endangered the lives of innocent families. In addition to the physical and economic damage caused by the decade long struggle between Liberals and Conservatives, the country also had to pay a price in political terms. In effect, the U.S. presence served once again to extend Conservative rule beyond its expected lifespan, retard the liberalization of the economy and most importantly, further suppress the peasantry by inhibiting their development as a viable agricultural sector.
The "chaos" caused by the relentless power struggle between the Liberals and Conservatives, combined with the U.S. intervention, became a focal point for the dissatisfaction of the peasantry. Augusto César Sandino, a peasant general, waged and lost a war to wrest control of the state from the government and its imperialist supporters. He began his military career as an idealistic young man who was heavily influenced by his personal contact with revolutionary Mexico. As a young man Sandino fled Nicaragua in 1921 because of his role in a fight that seriously wounded another youth and his subsequent problems with the village "cacique".(49) During his self-imposed exile he worked for a series of North American companies in neighbouring countries and through his experience developed a hatred for imperialism.(50) Sandino's exile in Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico proved to be a turning point in his life. He came into contact with Mexican nationalists and ultra-nationalistic Central Americans from whom he developed his political and social philosophy.(51) While there is no doubt about Sandino's nationalistic aspirations for Nicaragua, there is some question as to his conception of social change. Sandino identified with the Liberals and conducted his war as a nationalist and anti-imperialist cause. As soon as the United States marines left Nicaragua, Sandino agreed to end his struggle, retreat to the northeastern Jinotega and abandon his followers in other parts of the country. Notwithstanding the debate about the depth of Sandino's radicalism, the fact that he and his army became a "cause célébre" for the left in many parts of the world, indicates the perception of his movement among politicians in Nicaragua and the United States.
Despite government propaganda that labeled Sandino as a bandit and Communist, the rebel general did not appear to have a firm grasp of the nature of his supporters' discontent.(52) Although the general spent his life in daily contact with the peasantry, the experience that seems to have radicalized him was his contact with U.S. capital penetration in Central America. To Sandino, the proletarianization of the peasantry was secondary to the presence of foreign business interests in Nicaragua. According to Gregorio Selser, Sandino denied that his movement was basically agrarian and asserted that the "ragged characters" on the streets of Granada were poor and hungry because they simply did not "choose to work on coffee estates."(53) The General was more concerned about foreign control over the economy than he was about the effect that agricultural intensification had on the people who supported him. Consistent with Sandino's misconception of the causes of poverty was his opinion that agrarianism, as a basis for popular support, did not have more than a limited "field of action" in Nicaragua and that the dispossessed preferred a "modest idling way of life".(54) The real issue for Sandino was the United States military and economic dominance over the country and his solution was to chase the northern invader out of Nicaragua. Despite his penchant for nationalism, the significance of Sandino in Nicaraguan history is based upon the support his army had among the rural populace. His promises of a "humanitarian program" and "liberty" for Nicaragua garnered the support of the sector of society that suffered the most from the injustices of the system.
Within the country itself, Sandino's support among the peasantry can be measured by the presence of 800 men and women, most of whom were without firearms, in his first confrontation with the North American invaders in 1927. Although the "Battle of Ocotal" as it became known, with its death toll of 300 men, women and children, was a complete military disaster, it illustrates the willingness of the peasantry to participate with an unknown leader in an armed struggle.(55) Despite the enormous efforts of various Nicaraguan political factions and their supporters from the United States, Sandino's popularity among the peasantry continued to grow. The rural poor provided and sustained his soldiers, supplied information concerning enemy actions and paid a price in lives for openly supporting the "crazy little army" of Augusto César Sandino. Between 1927 and 1934 Sandino's support among the peasantry ebbed and flowed with his ability to maintain their security. By 1933, when the marines left the country and the war was officially ended, Sandino had 6,000 men under his command and their operations covered ten of Nicaragua's sixteen departments.(56) As part of the cease-fire agreement, the peasant general was given amnesty, and allowed to keep 100 men under arms and retreat to the Rio Coco river valley where a communal agricultural project was established.(57)
Sandino's struggle and its broad support among the rural masses are typified by the conditions that he encountered at the U.S. owned San Albino mine. Gregorio Selser describes the San Albino mine as the place where Sandino grasped for the first time the full "wretchedness to which the workers of his country had been reduced."(58) Workers were not alone in their squalor; the suffering and subsequent willingness to fight of a large part of the rural populace emerges in the historical accounts of the first Sandinistas. Although Sandino denied that his movement was basically agrarian because of the limited number of latifundia and the availability of land in the interior regions, parallels exist between the abject circumstances which led to peasant support in Nicaragua and the conditions which provided for Zapata's success in Mexico. In addition, the collapse of the capitalist world's economy and the concomitant need to intensify neo-colonial exploitation in countries like Nicaragua, increased the burden carried by the formerly self-reliant peasantry.
The reasons for Sandino's appeal are reflected in the collapse of the world economy and its effect on those members of society upon which the exploitive nature of the capitalist system took its toll. During the 1920s the expanding world markets for Nicaraguan exports resulted in an increase in the demand for agricultural land and heightened the tensions between export and subsistence cultivators. The economic collapse of 1929, and the decade of disaster that followed, further intensified an already explosive situation. According to Jaime Wheelock, coffee exports increased by 80 percent between 1927 and 1935 but the price for the export declined at a corresponding rate to less than half of what it was prior to the crisis.(59) Although the 1930s was considered an economic disaster, the unprecedented increases in coffee exports, combined with the depression of wages paid to agricultural labourers, set the stage for the latifundist prosperity of the 1940s. Consequently, the government's struggle with Sandino and the peasantry was a reflection of the intensification of the exploitation required by the latifundists to remain competitive amidst a crumbling world economy. The failure of Sandino's peasant struggle to change conditions of life for the rural poor marks the beginning of the acceleration of the process of agrarian change that began with the introduction of coffee as an export commodity back in the 1800s. Like coffee in the nineteenth century, the introduction of new export crops demanded changes in the patterns of land tenure to favor the cultivation of commercial crops. Increased demands were placed on agricultural land and the rural population to produce more for the export market.
The emergence of a world economic crisis that paralleled Sandino's struggle and his popularity in the rural areas contributed greatly to the appeal of the popular rebellion. Depressed world markets for Nicaragua's exports, combined with the geographic expansion of the area devoted to non-domestic agriculture resulted in high levels of unemployment and some cases of starvation among the peasantry. In addition, the war with Sandino put an added strain on the national budget and in 1931 and 1932 schools and colleges were closed as a war saving.(60) In contrast, the National Guard, a paramilitary police force created by the United States to battle Sandino, absorbed one-fourth of the national budget during the same period.(61) As a result of the war, transportation, communication and social service systems ceased to function in large parts of the country. In addition to the hardships of war, four years of drought beginning in 1927 were followed by a major earthquake in Managua in 1931. Natural disasters exacerbated an already difficult situation and added to the dire situation in which most rural dwellers found themselves.
Neill Macaulay illustrates the desperation of Sandino's supporters who consistently sought avenge upon merchants, latifundists and foreign businesses.(62) Macaulay claims that in addition to looting food, clothing and medicine, Sandino's forces attempted to provide tools for agriculture to their followers. To counter the effects of the world economic crisis, guerrilla forces carried out land reform and established agricultural co-operatives in the areas they controlled. In doing so they dismantled latifundios, levied taxes and marketed agricultural produce much to the chagrin of landowners throughout the country. Sandino may not have understood the intricacies of the peasant support for his movement but he did witness their revenge on the people they held responsible for their suffering and on the property they owned. For example, the massacre of the peasantry at Ocotal in 1927 resulted from their refusal to obey the order to withdraw because of their preoccupation with looting and seeking revenge for past injustices.(63) The desperation of the peasantry who participated in the attack, is evidenced by their looting spree which emptied stores of food and clothing -- not luxury items. As a result of a general lack of control, Sandino's army suffered several defeats and near obliteration before turning the tide on the North American troops and their Nicaraguan hosts. Only after the peasant army changed its tactics from frontal attacks accompanied by anarchic looting sprees to guerrilla warfare that revenged the mistreatment of the poor, could Sandino claim to command an army.
A darker side of the peasant army's struggle in the countryside emerges in the literature in the form of excesses of war, the purpose of which was to terrify the civilian population in order to dissuade co-operation with the enemy and to punish those considered to have committed treason. The famous Sandinista justice system that penalized suspected traitors with machete cuts to the chest, throat, skull or the amputation of the legs, or genitals, served to traumatize rural dwellers.(64) Lesser offences resulted in the burning or vandalizing of the suspect's house.(65) Sandino's military commanders are said to have tried to prevent indiscriminate abuses by their followers but with limited success. To this end, attempts were made to record the dues that were exacted from the land owners and merchants who were forced to contribute. Despite efforts to control the guerrilla army, cases of pillaging and unwarranted violence were recorded.
In contrast, the retribution against suspected enemies of the state by the U.S. Marines and their partners is always cited as generating support for the peasant general's cause. Almost all of the counter-insurgency operations of the government and U.S. forces were conducted in the rural areas. As part of the effort to crush the rebellion the concept of "strategic hamlets," that would later become famous in the Vietnam war, was first employed in Nicaragua. Anyone who the Marines or Guard caught outside of the hamlets was treated as the enemy, which ultimately meant death or imprisonment in the "concentration camps" that were set up to deal with prisoners of war.(66) In addition to the repression of the foreign troops and the National Guard, a police force created at the insistence of the U.S. government, was reported to have burned 70 villages and hamlets in the first year of its campaign against the Sandinistas.(67) The assassinations, rapes, assaults and thefts perpetrated by the Marines and their proteges were directed against a defenseless and often innocent peasantry. Peasant families were strafed by the U.S. aircraft squadrons, prisoners were tortured and bodies were mutilated during the war.(68) The immediate result of the repression was to swell the ranks of Sandino's army with the terrorized peasants whose communities were outside of the neutral zones and under attack from the government and its allies. Although resistance was not new to the people who made up Sandino's forces and his supporters, the destructive force with which the government counter attacked was.
The Nicaraguan countryside can only be described as in a state of anarchy during Sandino's war against imperialism. Three different military forces, the Sandinistas, the U.S. Marines and the National Guard, demanded the loyalty of the peasantry. People who were thought to collaborate with the enemy were treated harshly by participants on both sides of the conflict. The rural poor, who had their human rights abused by both sides in the conflict, were well aware of the tenuous nature of their security. Virtually every confrontation between Sandino and the government forces occurred in the marginalized areas of the country to which the dispossessed peasantry had moved after the expansion of coffee. As a result, the peasants knew that they could only be as openly supportive of the guerrilla cause as their security would guarantee. Between 1927 and 1933, many peasant families lived in constant fear that their actions would be interpreted as treasonable by one or the other army. In spite of the fact that Sandino and his poorly equipped army could not offer more than occasional protection for individual non-combatants, a significant number of peasants risked their lives for his ideals. By the end of the war thousands of peasants had been affected by the chaos in the countryside but little had changed.
The U.S. Marines left on January 1, 1933, without securing a victory over the Sandinistas. Anastasio Somoza García was left to head the National Guard. The withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces and Sandino's lack of a solid political platform from which to continue his war against imperialism, led the peasant general to accept the terms of a cease-fire and disarmament at the beginning of February.(69) Finally, in 1934, Sandino was murdered by Somoza's men, hundreds of his followers were massacred and the necessary conditions were created for the reinstatement of the latifundia system in guerrilla controlled areas. Somoza put an end to the "crazy little army" of Augusto C. Sandino and the advances he had made toward ending U.S. dominance of the economy. The death of Sandino and the destruction of his army ended an important era in the political and economic development of the Nicaraguan state. The victory of imperialism over nationalism served as a catalyst for the acceleration of the agricultural changes that had stagnated during the first part of the century. By the end of the war, changes in the world's political future could be seen on the horizon, and Nicaragua's new leaders were poised to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the coming struggle between the imperial powers of Europe and Asia. Finally, after a brief flirtation with fascism, Nicaragua became fully entrenched as an active participant in the maintenance of United States hegemony over the Americas.
1. See for example, Philip F. Warnken, The Agricultural Development of Nicaragua (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975); or Gary W. Wynia, Politics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in Central America (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972).
2. For example, Humberto Ortega Saavedra, Jaime Wheelock and Carlos Fonseca, often clandestinely, published articles and books that were widely circulated during the 1970s and were later released by the Departamento de Propaganda y Educación Politica del FSLN, after 1979. For example, Jaime Wheelock, Imperialismo y dictadura: crisis de una formación social (Mexico: Siglo XXI 1975).
3. A superficial yet interesting account of the Somoza's family's dictatorship can be found in Eduardo Crawley, Dictators Never Die: A Portrait of Nicaragua and the Somoza Dynasty (New York: St. Martens Press, 1979).
4. John A. Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), is a good example of an author who succeeds a writing in sympathetic yet critical account of the history of the Nicaraguan revolution.
5. Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family (New York: Random House, 1985). Robert A. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). Abraham Brumberg, "Nicaragua: A Mixture of Shades," Dissent (Spring/Summer 1986). See also, Robert Leiken, "Nicaragua's untold Story," The New Republic (October 1984). and David Nolan, The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1984).
6. Pains are taken by such authors to emphasize their support for the overthrow of Somoza but their displeasure with the subsequent complexion of the revolution. Coincidently, the United States government, after forty years of support for "Somocismo", takes an identical stance.
7. For example: Forest Colburn, "Foot Dragging and other Peasant Responses to the Nicaraguan Revolution," Peasant Studies 13 (Winter 1986). Carmen Diana Deere, "Nicaraguan Agricultural Policy: 1979-81," Cambridge Journal of Economics 5 (1981). Carlos Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986). See also, James Petras, "Whither the Nicaraguan Revolution?" Monthly Review (October 1979), for an example of the more "radical" criticism of the Sandinistas.
8. See for example Carlos Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution, p.119-121.
9. Kai T. Erickson, Everything in its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976); Anastasia M. Shkilnyk, A Poison Stronger Than Love: The Destruction of an Ojibwa Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Art Hansen and Anthony Oliver-Smith eds., Involuntary Migration and Resettlement: The Problems and Responses of Dislocated People (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982).
10. Margaret Randall, Sandino's Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle (Toronto: New Star Books, 1981), p.v.
11. Kai Erikson, Everything in its Path, p.255.
12. Vladimir Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution", Collected Works: 1908-1909 (Moscow Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1966).
13. David Goodman, and Michael Redclift, From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist Development and Agrarian Transition, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981).
14. Eric Wolf, "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion," American Anthropologist 57 (1955). Eric Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Politics," Journal of Peasant Studies 1 (October 1973).
15. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Social Classes in Agrarian Societies (New York: Anchor Books, 1975).
16. Sidney Mintz, "A Note on the Definition of Peasantries," The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.1 (October 1973). p.95.
17. Nicaragua has historically had the lowest population density in Central America and in recent years has had the highest population growth rate on isthmus.
18. Everyone in the society had a place in the rigid hierarchy, everyone had obligations to fulfill and they all benefitted to a degree. The system was characterized by unequal relations between producers and the owners of the means of production, but it worked and the entire society came to depend upon it.
19. C.H. Haring offers a good survey of the history of the Audiencia de Guatemala in his book entitled The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1963).
20. ibid.
21. Warnken, The Agricultural Development of Nicaragua., (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975).
22. ibid., p.16.
23. ibid., p.27.
24. Ralph Lee Woodward Jr., offers a good summary of the history of Central America in his book Central America: A Nation Divided (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 1985).
25. For example, Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union: Central America 1824-1975 (Tempe, Arizona: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, 1976).
26. See for example Jaime Wheelock, Imperialismo Y Dictadura.
27. Woodward, Central America, p.128-136.
28. Karnes, The Failure of Union, p.176-177.
29. Virtually every author offers a version of Walker's exploits in Central America; none of which could be considered flattering.
30. Henri Weber, Nicaragua: The Sandinista Revolution (Thetford, Norfolk: Thetford Press Limited, 1981), p.4-5; Woodward, Central America: A Nation Divided, p.271.
31. The size of the indigenous population in nineteenth century Nicaragua is difficult to ascertain because of problems of definition. However, contemporary investigators commonly use a figure of four percent to refer to the sector of society that is considered Amerindian.
32. Wheelock, Imperialismo Y Dictadura, p.25-26.
33. ibid., p.77.
34. idem,
35. ibid., p.65-70.
36. Woodward, Central America: A Nation Divided, p.157.
37. ibid., p.160.
38. Weber, Nicaragua, p.6.
39. Jaime Biderman, "The Development of Capitalism in Nicaragua: A Political Economic History," Latin American Perspectives, 10 (1983), p.11.
40. Charles D. Kepner Jr., Social Aspects of the Banana Industry, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936) p.55-57.
41. Ibid, 67.
42. ibid, p.56.
43. ibid. p.12
44. 44 Charles D Kepner Jr., and Jay Henry Soothill, The Banana Empire: A Case Study of Economic Imperialism, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1935) p. 337.
45. Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictadura, p.74-75.
46. Weber, Nicaragua, p.6-7; Black, Triumph of the People, p.7.
47. John A. Booth, The End and Beginning p.24.
48. Jaime Wheelock and Luis Carrión, p.86.
49. Joseph O. Baylen, "Sandino: Patriot or Bandit", Hispanic American Historical Review, (August 1951), p.394.
50. For a critical view of Sandino's uprising see Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Durham NC.: Duke University Press, 1985).
51. Baylen, "Patriot or Bandit?" p.394-395.
52. The leading Nicaraguan press of the time consistently referred to Sandino and his men as "bandaleros" in order to diminish his credibility. Sandino was so concerned about his image that in the first peace proposal he insisted that all records that refer to his army as bandits be withdrawn from the national archives and destroyed.
53. Gregorio Selser, Sandino, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), p.97-98.
54. idem,.
55. ibid,. p .81.
56. Black, Triumph of the People, p.22.
57. Baylen, "Patriot or Bandit?" p.418-419.
58. Selser, Sandino, p.65.
59. Jaime Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictadura, p.125.
60. Selser, Sandino, p.137.
61. Booth, End and the Beginning, p.44.
62. Macaulay, Sandino Affair, p.210-214.
63. Selser, Sandino, p.80.
64. Macaulay, Sandino Affair, p.212-213, and Selser, Sandino, p.113-115, offer particularly vivid descriptions of sadism inflicted on the peasantry by both armies. For a glimpse at the way Sandino was portrayed by the Nicaraguan government see Anastacio Somoza, El Verdadero Sandino O El Calvario de Las Segovias, (Managua, 1934).
65. Macaulay, Sandino Affair, p.213.
66. Black, Triumph of the People, p.19.
67. Selser, Sandino, p.115.
68. Macaulay, Sandino Affair, p.228-229.
69. Black, Triumph of the People, p.21.
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