Identity in Transition:
From West Indian Immigrant to Afro-Costarricense

(Chapter appearing in English Speaking Communities in Latin America, MacMillan U.K. and St. Martin's U.S.A., 2000)


The end of slavery in the British West Indies created what one author has called the "problem of freedom." Although every facet of Caribbean society underwent change in the wake of emancipation, the issue that enveloped all others was the restructuring of the economy. The challenges faced by both planters and exslaves in the evolving capitalist environment of the mid-nineteenth century Caribbean is well known. Some estates failed, others were converted into modern plantations and the fate of everyone in the region was determined by the new economy. For many people of African descent, migration in and around the Caribbean offered one possible solution to the problems they encountered as wage labourers. The unprecedented freedom of mobility exslaves and their descendants experienced in the wake of emancipation is best illustrated in the employment opportunities arose in Panama and other parts of Central America. In total, between approximately 1850 and 1950, as many as 500,000 men, women and children went to Western shores of the Caribbean where they found work on construction projects like the Panama Canal and various railways, or on the newly developed banana plantations that dotted the Caribbean coast of Central America.

One of the most interesting aspects of the West Indian diaspora to in Middle America is the cultural transformation that occurred as people adapted to new circumstances in an Hispanic environment. Often arriving with little or no financial security, limited skills and an uncertain future, West Indians proved adept at assessing and exploiting opportunities. Their ability to adjust to new surrounding and demands was all the more remarkable because they usually found themselves in situations where racial discrimination was prevalent. Wherever West Indians arrived in Middle America, they found themselves confronted with a set of issues specific to the location and their objective, in order to succeed, was to look for solutions that allowed for their social reproduction as individuals and as a community. The West Indian experience in Costa Rica offers a good example of the process of adaptation to new cultural surroundings.

Between 1870 and 1950 tens of thousands of British West Indian migrants went to Costa Rica in search of work in the banana producing province of Limón. In time, they were joined by friends, relatives, family members and others to form one of the most vibrant expatriate West Indian communities on the Central American coast. The population of the province increased from a few hundred people in the mid-nineteenth century to over 32,000 by 1927. Approximately 58% of the provincial population in 1927 immigrants from came from the British West Indies or their Costa Rican-born offspring. Though the exact number of immigrants is not known, according to one study, between 1891 and 1911 alone close to 43,000 Jamaicans made their way to Costa Rica to work on the banana plantations. Thousands of others also came from other British possessions in the region. Most of the West Indians who arrived on Costa Rica's shores moved on, but others remained and these people came to comprise the largest ethnic minority group in the country.

The West Indian migration to Costa Rica was generated by high levels of unemployment in the West Indies and by the United Fruit Company's desire for a mobile work force that could be shuffled between plantations. Another factor that favoured workers from the West Indies was the desire of Costa Rican coffee producers to keep the existing Hispanic labour force in the highlands. As a result, the Costa Rican government turned a blind eye to massive importation of foreign workers. West Indian men and women established new homes in the country and another English-speaking community came into existence in Central America.

As a consequence of its attachment to the United Fruit Company the history of the West Indian community in Costa Rica also parallels the fortunes of the banana industry in the region. The decade beginning in 1900 saw phenomenal growth in Costa Rica's banana exports. The first significant shipments of bananas began in the late 1880s, when just under one million stems were exported. By 1900, exports climbed to 3,420,186 stems and two years later to 4,174,199. By 1908 around ten million stems were being exported each year and the industry peaked in 1913 when Costa Rica became the world's leading exporter of bananas, shipping 11,117,833 stems. Record levels of production were followed by a lengthy decline which culminated in the near total cessation of production during the late 1930s and 1940s.

Similarly, the number of people of African descent arriving in Costa Rica from the West Indies increased until the mid-1910s, then gradually tapered off until the flow was reversed and the size of the West Indian community declined. Also, over the course of time the British West Indian community became more diversified and self-sufficient with members working on and off the plantations. Some were labourers, others were artisans or small business owners, and a few were professionals of one sort or another. The world of the banana enclave, with its booms and busts, also meant that the community's attachment to Costa Rica remained tenuous until the onset of the economic crisis of the 1930s when, as a result of mounting political problems for the governments of the day, people of African descent came under pressure to either integrate or emigrate.

The increasing pressure to identify with Costa Rica stemmed from the cultural and geographic divide between the Hispanic highlands and the West Indian lowlands. The West Indian communities of the Province of Limón were geographically separated from the Hispanic majority, therefore, people in the region retained much of their island identities. They lived their lives in English, attended Protestant churches, and participated organizations like the Universal Negro Improvement Association. Moreover newspapers like The Central American Express, The Atlantic Voice, and even The Daily Gleaner, along with the constant flow of people to and from the islands kept West Indians in Costa Rica in touch with events in the Caribbean and beyond. As a result, the English language, West Indian culture and a different world view remained the cornerstone of community life in Limón during the first decades of the twentieth century.

Although the community always suffered discrimination and injustice in Middle America, the turning point in the West Indian history in Costa Rica came in 1934 when legislation was passed by the government of President Ricardo Jiménez to curb what was seen as the "Africanisation" of the country. In the midst of a massive strike by Hispanic workers on the plantations in Limón, the government and the United Fruit Company agreed to a new contract to regulate the industry. Along with a commitment to favour private planters, pay higher prices and expand production on the Pacific coast, United Fruit agreed to favour Costa Ricans in the work force and not introduce "Negroes, or Jamaicans" to the new banana zone. The exclusion of West Indians from jobs on the Pacific coast, at a time when their Spanish-speaking counterparts were on strike, can only be seen as having a dual intent: Hispanics could rest assured that the entire country would not be "Africanised," and the strike on the Atlantic coast would be undermined.

Not surprisingly, on 28 August 1934, just three days after United Fruit accepted the reforms proposed by Congress, an agreement was reached in the office of the Secretary of Labour between representatives of the banana planters and the workers. The labour dispute was over, except for a brief and unsuccessful resumption two weeks later. The West Indian community was the biggest loser despite having refrained from participating in the strike. The United Fruit Company was given control over the banana industry in a fertile new region and "people of colour" were prohibited from working for the company on the Pacific Coast. The circumstances of the West Indian community in Costa Rica changed overnight and people of African descent everywhere in the country came under increased scrutiny.

At the time of the signing of the 1934 banana contract, the residents of the Atlantic coast were also faced with a natural threat to their livelihood. Two strains of untreatable plant disease were devastating the Atlantic region and the only solution for growers was to move to uninfected areas. The spread of disease on the Atlantic coast was the reason United Fruit sought to establish new plantations on the Pacific coast. Although United Fruit lost profit as the disease spread, the infection benefited some West Indian immigrants because they moved into areas abandoned by the company and continued producing bananas on small plots of land. Their advantage was that they could physically remove infected plants and continue to market fruit to the company. After 1934, however, West Indian producers lost their ability to market bananas because United Fruit began removing bridges, railways and other infrastructural installations that were needed on the Pacific coast.

As United Fruit moved its operations to the other side of the country, the Costa Rican government's presence in Limón became more intrusive. The government built upon the provisions of the contract to increase its effective control over the province of Limón. Beginning in 1934, a series of reforms in taxation, education and immigration laws were introduced by the Costa Rican government. Segregation spread from United Fruit's "White Zone," where company managers and their families lived, to the city of Limón and the surrounding region. Through various means, individual West Indians were forced to make important decisions about their future in Costa Rica.

The West Indian community of Limón, especially its youth, found itself in a precarious situation when the banana industry began to disappear. They could not find work in Limón, they could not follow the company to the Pacific coast and, most importantly, they had no place else to go because they were already living in their homes. Despite the fact that the majority of people of African descent were well established in Costa Rica and many were born in the country, they were still considered to be foreigners. As a result, the government began a process of both tightening immigration and documenting foreigners. People of non-European descent were singled out for special attention. The efforts to control the growth and spread of the West Indian community culminated in 1942, when a decree that prohibited the immigration of "the black race, Chinese, Arabs, Turks, Syrians, Armenians, Gypsies, Coolies, etc." was passed. The objectives of the government were obvious and West Indians were left with two alternatives. They could turn their backs on the problem and leave the country in search of a better future, or they could stay and make the best of a bad situation.

Although no official statistics are available to quantify the number of people who left Costa Rica after 1934, it is possible to make reasonable estimates. According to census figures, between 1927 and 1950 the "Negro and mulatto" population in Costa Rica decreased from 21,257 to 15,188 for a net loss of 6,139 or 29 percent. However, if the emigrants and any children they might have had after leaving Costa Rica are included in the calculations, the loss to the community between 1927 and 1950 amounted to a total of 19,000 people or 62 percent of the possible population. In addition, the drain on the community was aggravated by the fact that the emigrants were primarily younger people who had a good chance of succeeding abroad. Anyone who was less likely to be able obtain employment on plantations or construction, usually women, children and the elderly, stayed where they were.

For those people of West Indian descent who remained in the country two strategies could be followed. They could either attempt to integrate into Costa Rican society by becoming citizens, or they could somehow resist the forces that threatened their West Indian identity. The people who were most likely to try to fit in were either those who had built a secure life for themselves, or Costa-Rican-born West Indians who did not have attachments to another country. However, the census reveals that the West Indians who became citizens were still a minority in the community in 1950. The majority of West Indians maintained a distance from mainstream society, which indicates the reluctance or inability of most members of the community to become citizens of Costa Rica. Less is known about those who did not become Costa Rican citizens because they tended to make a point of remaining in the shadows. Much more is known about the 6,500 people of African descent in Costa Rica were citizens at the time of the 1950 census.

The most significant group to become Costa Ricans were the Costa-Rican-born West Indians who had the right to opt for citizenship by virtue of having been born in the country. Government documents reveal that prior to 1928 no Costa Rican-born West Indians had opted for citizenship. However, as pressure to integrate increased, larger numbers of locally-born West Indians chose to formalize their relationship with the country. In October 1930, the government passed a law creating a central registry for Naturalization and Options. The Civil Registry was to be responsible for obtaining all relevant information and deciding on the merits of each application. Between 1935 and 1950, a total of 2,191 people of African descent opted for Costa Rican citizenship. Of the total, 2,155 identified themselves through their parents' nationality as West Indian in origin. Those who opted for citizenship amounted a total of 14.3 percent of all persons of African decent who were still in the country for the census of 1950.

According to the rules, anyone who was born in the country, had a respectable reputation, and could supply written or oral documentation to back his or her statements had the right to Costa Rican citizenship. Of the 2,155 people of West Indian origin who opted for Costa Rican citizenship between 1935 and 1950, 80 percent were between 21 and 36 years of age. That so many people applied upon reaching the age of majority indicates a desire for citizenship and the security it could provide. One of the more striking features of the profile of the 2,155 applicants is that one third were between the ages of 21 and 25. It was, therefore, primarily young adults who made the decision to stay in Costa Rica. Moreover, of the 900 women and 1,255 men who opted for citizenship, 1,567 did so between 1941 and 1947, a period when pressure to conform was at its highest.

Informants also confirmed that those who exercised their right to the option tended to be young and independent of the community. People found it easier to live in Limón surrounded by other West Indians, but the opportunities for young people were found in San José. In the capital, the ability to speak Spanish and the need to rely on government services was essential because of a lack of community support. The move to San José was also a means of escape for people who no longer thought of themselves as West Indians and who wanted to integrate into Costa Rican society.

The most revealing statistic in terms of the way citizenship was seen as a means of security can be found in the percentage of individuals who opted for citizenship while living in the highlands where people of African descent were an uncommon sight. By 1950 between 70 and 80 percent of all the people who were identified as "Negroes" or "mulattos" and who were living in San José had opted for citizenship. The application for citizenship was, therefore, an automatic part of moving to the highlands for young Costa Rican-born West Indians. In comparison, only 7 percent of all "Negroes" and "mulattos" who lived in the province of Limón chose citizenship during the same period. Life away from family and friends meant reduced security and the need to seek protection in the Costa Rican constitution.

The people who heeded the call to become Costa Rican gradually began to represent a new force in the community. A petition sent in January 1940 to President Léon Cortés revealed the distinctions that were emerging within the community. The petition from Jorge Curling De Lisser (Delisser) and Roberto Sutherland Polson was the first evidence of Costa Rican-born West Indians asking for special treatment. They asked the President to re-examine Article 5 of the 1934 contract because it discriminated against Costa Rican citizens. Sutherland and Curling were "coloured" Costa Rican citizens who wanted their rights as citizens to be upheld. They argued that the constitution guaranteed them equality under the law and that Article 5 discriminated against citizens of colour by prohibiting everyone of African descent from working for United Fruit on the Pacific coast. Their point was that everyone of African descent need not be excluded from the jobs on the Pacific coast. Cortés passed their petition to the Minister of Development, Ricardo Pacheco, on whose desk it sat for a month. On 22 February, 1940, Curling and Sutherland sent a letter to the Minister of Development asking him to please respond to the petition.

Ricardo Pacheco was not sympathetic to the plight of West Indians in Costa Rica. He had responded in 1937 to a similar request from United Fruit by stating that the law was a "legitimate means of protecting the racial composition of the country." Consequently, Pacheco wrote Curling and Sutherland telling them that it was a matter for the courts to decide. By telling the petitioners to take their case to the courts, Pacheco was both dismissing the concerns of the Afro-Costa Rican community and ensuring a continuation of the ban on black labour. Some months later a challenge to the law was launched in civil court by workers who argued that their economic interests were being seriously prejudiced by the restrictions on their activities. The civil court challenge failed because, according to the court, the article in the contract had been signed into law and repeal required the cooperation of the government.

One of the results of Curling's and Sutherland's efforts was to steer the debate away from the issues of racism and toward the rights of citizens. People like Sutherland and Curling, who challenged the law, argued that those who had become citizens should be allowed to work anywhere they pleased. They represented the few hundred members of the community who had obtained Costa Rican citizenship by 1940 and not the majority of people of African descent. The struggle continued in the highlands in July 1940 when the first in a series of meetings was held in San José to fight for the rights of "coloured" Costa Ricans. At the meeting, Alex Curling Delisser, a prominent, young Afro-Costa Rican told the assembled group that "several Costarricans in good standing" were in sympathy with the cause. Although Curling did not reveal who was sympathetic to the plight of Afro-Costa Ricans, his admission was indicative of the organizational efforts of those who felt betrayed by their adopted country.

A few weeks after Curling's meeting, ex-President Ricardo Jiménez wrote a letter to the Diario de Costa Rica defending citizens of colour. The response to Jiménez's letter was mixed. On the one hand, the former president raised the ire of a group of fifty workers from the Pacific coast plantations who wrote a letter to La Tribuna accusing West Indians of being aggressive, vain and a burden to Costa Rica. They chastised Jiménez for meddling in their affairs by advocating the abolition of the Pacific coast colour ban. On the other hand, members of the West Indian community were appreciative of the ex-President's contribution because he represented authority. They expressed their appreciation in a letter to the local newspaper in Limón in which they thanked Jiménez for his contribution and humanitarian sentiments. Obviously, they had forgotten that it was the Jimenez government that passed the restrictive legislation into law in 1934.

The letter from the West Indians came from a new group in Limón called the National Progressive Association of the Youths of Colour of the Atlantic Zone. The Association wrote its letter of thanks "in the name of Costarricans of the Coloured race." A short time later, after a name change, the National Association for the Advancement of Young Coloured People (NAAYCP) began a membership drive, citing a desire to assure the "welfare of future generations." The NAAYCP was followed by a number of similar organizations, such as the Afro-Costarrican Youth Uplift Association and the National Association for the Progress of Coloured Costa Ricans. Each group was established to represent those members of the community who had opted to become Costa Rican citizens. As such, they formed a distinct and generally élite group within the community. The new organizations styled themselves as the leaders in the struggle for Afro-Costa Rican rights.

The political context for West Indians in Costa Rica also changed during the 1930s, and by 1940, with the global economic crisis at an end and another world war under way, a new era began. Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia was elected in 1940 with the support of 90 percent of Costa Rican voters. He had an interest in social reform and sought to make fundamental changes in the role played by government. Social security legislation, a progressive labour code and constitutional amendments codifying workers' rights were enacted during Calderón's term in office. His reforms alienated upper class supporters and Calderón was forced to form new alliances. The Catholic Church, which had lost much of its political influence in the late nineteenth century, was also counted among Calderón's allies because the new archbishop, Víctor Sanabria, shared the government's goal of reform.

However, Calderón's political problems began when he entered into an alliance with the Communist Party. The Communists emerged from the decade of depression as a powerful political bloc. Though only a decade old, the Communist Party developed into an important part of the Costa Rican political scene. The influence of the Communist Party in Costa Rica increased throughout the 1930s as the population became disenchanted with government attempts to deal with the economic crisis. In addition, the general trend among communists was to follow Stalin's wartime policy of building alliances against fascism. The Costa Rican party also supported the reform programmes of the period and were willing to lend their support to Calderon because he offered a platform to the communists. Consequently, during Calderón's term in office the communists gained support among the electorate and manoeuvred into a position of relative power.

The coffee oligarchy and traditional bourgeoisie who supported Calderón in 1940 soon turned against him. They supported the return of León Cortés in the 1944 election, but he got only one-third of the votes and the anti-Calderonista forces were forced to reconsider their strategy. The constitution prevented Rafael Calderón from succeeding himself, but a trusted member of his party secured the presidency for the reformers. The new President, Teodoro Picado Michaliski, continued along the path defined by Calderón. For his part, Calderón remained behind the scenes in preparation for the 1948 elections which culminated in a brief civil war. The background to and outcome of Costa Rica's civil war form an important chapter in the history of the West Indian community in the country.

Costa Rica's civil war is rooted in the tensions brought about by World War Two. West Indians, many of whom were British subjects, were among the first in Costa Rica to support the allied effort. Several members of the community had distinguished themselves in the Great War as members of the West India Regiment and the threat posed by Adolph Hitler out sentiments of loyalty to the British Empire. The community raised money for the British troops and received the gratitude of the British government for their contributions. People from Limón also registered with the local consul in the event that they were needed at the front. In 1941, two years after the West Indian community went to war, Costa Rica joined on the side of the Allies. Despite the desire among members of the community to fight for the Empire, the greatest impact on Limón was economic.

Like most Latin American countries, Costa Rica was not in a position to make a military contribution to the war. Costa Rica declared war on Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbour, but the country's formal entrance into the war a day before the United States was the only decisive move it made. For most other wartime decisions the government struggled to gain popular support for its initiatives. An effort was made to contribute to the Allied victory, but Costa Ricans could only participate by assisting the United States in its efforts to secure agricultural supplies in the western hemisphere.

Despite Costa Rica's minor role in the war effort, the conflict resulted in one event that altered the course of the country's history. In July 1942 the San Pablo, a banana boat owned by United Fruit, was torpedoed in Limón harbour by a German submarine. Twenty West Indian dock workers were killed and the port facilities were severely damaged. The sinking of the San Pablo was not only a tragic loss of life but it also provided a spark that ignited Costa Rican politics and ultimately resulted in the full integration of the West Indian community. The San Pablo was the last banana boat to dock in Limón in 1942, marking the end of the first phase of banana production on Costa Rica's Atlantic coast. No banana ships called in Limón during 1943 and exports remained at all-time low levels until the 1960s. The sinking of the San Pablo also marked the beginning of a political redefinition of the country as a whole.

After the attack on the San Pablo, the Communists organized a demonstration in San José. The protest became violent and the shops of German and Italian immigrants were looted. Their owners were attacked by an unruly crowd while the authorities stood by. The failure of the government to intervene in the rioting enraged the opposition, who pointed to the involvement of the Communists as proof of the government's political orientation. In fact, the Communists played a role as agitators for Calderón's administration. From the time Costa Rica entered the war in 1941, the government had been involved in a vigorous campaign to persecute Axis nationals who happened to form an important part of the country's bourgeoisie. The riots that followed the sinking of the San Pablo were the most radical demonstrations of support for the Allied powers and the government's reaction to the protests enraged Calderon's opponents.

Among the many people who attacked the government for its complicity in the events following the sinking of the San Pablo was José Figueres Ferrer. Figueres was the son of a Spanish immigrant and a little known farmer who had studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After the sinking of the ship he attempted to make a radio speech denouncing the government for its incompetence and its apathy toward the riots in San José. He expressed his indignation over the government's treatment of the German and Italian immigrants. His speech was interrupted by police, he was thrown in jail and he was sent into exile a short time later. Figueres was just one of a growing number of opponents to the Calderón's government.

During the first years of Calderón's administration, the President the support of the conservatives who had helped him get elected. He alienated the wealthy by introducing social policies that favoured the lower classes. The arrest and exile of José Figueres Ferrer served to provide Calderón's opponents with a rallying point for their cause. In addition to generating antagonism among the conservative elements in Costa Rica, the reforms in education, immigration and labour, and his strong links with the Catholic Church also worked against West Indian interests. However, a significant difference existed between the Hispanic élite, who were in a position to form new political alliances to oppose the President, and members of the West Indian community which was were less capable of asserting their rights.

The rapid increase in the number of West Indians who opted for citizenship during the early 1940s indicates the pressure that the community was facing. As avenues for advancement within Costa Rican society were closed to outsiders, the number of people who became citizens increased. Of all the West Indians who opted for citizenship between 1935 and 1950, thirty-five percent did so during Calderón's presidency. Similarly, newspaper reports indicate that the height of West Indian exodus from Costa Rica occurred during the late 1930s and early 1940s. Hispanic government and society closed in on the West Indian community on Limón and the Calderón administration continued to apply pressure on people of African descent.

Although during the 1940s the government focussed most of its attention on the mounting political crisis in Costa Rica, West Indians were well aware that they were not welcome in the country. Between 1940 and 1948 two laws were passed that affected the West Indian community in Costa Rica. In 1942 the Calderón government changed the law to prohibit the immigration of racial minorities. Two years later the government of Teodoro Picado changed the law concerning options. An age limit was imposed for the first time in 1944. Those who did not act would forfeit the right to opt for Costa Rican citizenship.

The community's reaction to the 1944 legislation appeared in the form of a letter to The Atlantic Voice. In the newspaper, Feresford Duncan, a founding member of a new organization called the National Association for the Progress of Coloured Costa Ricans, warned West Indians that the government was considering the imposition of restrictions against foreign workers in the Atlantic Zone. His concern was, once again, for those people who could easily become Costa Rican citizens and not for those who were reluctant to associate themselves with an Hispanic country.

Duncan's appeal was followed by editorials, articles and other pleas for community members to opt for citizenship. In a strange twist that reflected the willingness of some community leaders to exchange a West Indian identity for a Costa Rican one, President Picado was portrayed as a man who had given them a chance. Yet Picado's imposition of an age limit for options was not an opportunity, but rather another in a long list of attempts to force the West Indians to shed their Caribbean identity. Indications are that the threats worked because 1945 became the year in which more community members opted for citizenship than ever before.

The mounting discrimination of the period between 1934 and 1944 occurred within a context of political polarization in Costa Rica. One of the most significant events was the exile of José Figueres in 1942. When he returned to Costa Rica from exile in 1944 he organized a moderate anticommunist political party that included support from different social classes. From the very beginning Figueres advocated constitutional changes that would result in wider popular participation in Costa Rican politics. In 1945 Figueres and the intellectuals from the Centro para El Estudio de los Problemas Nacionales formed the Partido Social Democrata (PSD) and were then joined by Acción Demócrata (AD), a group that had split from León Cortés's Partido Democrático. The PSD, therefore, enjoyed a broad base of support but lacked necessary ties to the oligarchy in order to triumph over Calderón. Out of necessity, the PSD was drawn toward union with the National Union Party (PUN) led by Otilio Ulate, a longtime member of Congress who was a vociferous critic of the United Fruit Company and its foreign labour force.

Both parties were concerned with the role played by Vanguardia Popular in the Picado administration and each leader was determined to prevent Calderón from regaining the presidency. Ulate cultivated his popularity through his various newspapers and while sitting as a member of the opposition for two decades. He was a well known public figure with a reputation for attempting to preserve traditional Costa Rican values and social relations. On the other hand, Figueres was much less well known and his party lacked the support of the business community. He did, however, enjoy the backing of a growing and increasingly powerful middle sector. Therefore, Ulate's party needed the support of the PSD to ensure victory at the polls. As the 1948 presidential campaign drew near, the two parties joined forces. A contest was held to see which party leader would run against Calderón the following year. In early 1947 Figueres was easily defeated in the contest to become the opposition candidate. Nevertheless, he agreed to support Ulate in the race.

The elections were to be held in February 1948. Rafael Angel Calderón and Otilio Ulate were the main candidates for the presidency. Calderón, as a former president, was the favoured candidate of the Picado administration, while Ulate was the representative of the disparate opposition forces. The race was extremely tight and after the ballots were counted , two of the members of the National Electoral Tribunal announced that Ulate had won the elections. A third member, however, placed his victory in doubt by calling for further investigation.

The situation deteriorated, culminating in violence. Congress, which was dominated by Calderón's party, was called upon by the government to annul the election. Ulate was arrested, but released shortly thereafter when the archbishop of San José intervened. Open rebellion erupted throughout the central valley. A group headed by José Figueres and calling itself Liberación Nacional launched a civil revolt, and within a few weeks defeated the forces loyal to the government.

At the beginning of the civil war President Picado's government told all Costa-Rican-born West Indians that their obligation was to defend the established order against Figueres and his supporters. The reaction of the majority of the community was to avoid taking sides. For example, when a rumour reached the coastal town of Cahuita that the government was sending soldiers to look for recruits, the young men fled. Most of the people in the community knew little about the intricacies of the political crisis; furthermore, they did not care. All they knew was that the trains were not running, shops were not open, the port was closed and shots were being fired in Limón.

The political struggles that concerned Hispanics were of little interest to West Indians. Experience told them that there were no guarantees that their interests would be protected by any of the warring factions. One man summed it up when he stated that the West Indians "didn't care who did win because we were just living." Indeed, most West Indians in Limón passed up opportunities to become citizens of Costa Rica and it was no surprise that they could not be counted on to participate in a war that did not concern them.

The most important aspect of the war was that it came to serve as a watershed in Costa Rica's modern history. The entire affair was short-lived and overall destruction in the country was minimal, however, the events of 1948 produced a new generation of politicians whose legitimacy rested on the role they played in the struggle. State policy did not change immediately, but the supporters of the former government and other vocal opponents to the new regime were persecuted. Severe restrictions on political freedom were introduced as a matter of course. According to one source, in the year that followed the civil war: "sixty unions were disbanded, seven thousand people were sent into exile, three thousand people were jailed and at least fourteen were executed." The repression that followed the victory served as an example to the new government's critics and, as a result, muted any West Indian concerns.

However before the end of the war West Indian residents of Limón demonstrated their desire to avoid confrontation. With the capture of Limón by the "Figueristas" and the subsequent successes in the Central Valley, the West Indian community sided openly with the victors. To have done anything else would have been to risk the same penalties imposed on the government's enemies. Nevertheless, West Indians knew who Otilio Ulate and José Figueres were. They knew that Ulate had a lengthy history of attacking the West Indian community and the Figueres had a degree of sympathy for Italian and German residents of Costa Rica during WWII. West Indians in Costa Rica also knew what their situation was like and they waited to see how the new political configuration would deal with them.

The Junta Fundadora, provisional government headed by Figueres, took steps to re-establish order in the country and in so doing increased the pressure on non-citizens. On 1 November, 1948, the head of the Departamento de Extranjeros of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública sent the United Fruit Company a request for information on all its foreign employees. The government wanted to know who they were, when they had been hired and if they had returned to work after the civil war. At the time the government was worried about the possibility of a "counter-revolution" and its request to United Fruit specifically asked for information about foreign employees who had come from the northern border area of Los Chiles. At the time Calderón was in exile in Nicaragua where he enjoyed the support of Anastasio Somoza. Nicaraguan troops had invaded Costa Rica during the civil war and the Junta suspected that some of the fruit company's employees were sympathetic to "counter-revolution." Nicaraguans in Costa Rica were targets not only because of Somoza but also because they were involved with organized labour. The request made to the United Fruit Company was only the first in a series of attempts by the junta to count the number of foreigners in the country.

A short time later a report in Limón's weekly newspaper, The Atlantic Post, in April 1949 indicated that the government was concerned about the large number of West Indians who were not Costa Ricans. The article expressed the continuing fears of the Hispanic majority by quoting a report that appeared in a San José daily. According to the San José press, there were thirty thousand West Indians in Costa Rica who were not citizens; many had no country of origin, and more than half did not speak Spanish. In fact, there were only about half the reported number of people of African descent in the country and many had made the transition from being West Indian to becoming Afro-Costa Rican. Nevertheless, the West Indian community had cause for concern because the article appeared during the run up to the elections for a Constituent Assembly which would decide if Figueres or Ulate would become president.

The use of the spectre of thirty thousand foreign residents of African descent living in a country of 800,000 people alarmed Costa Ricans. Figueres, like his predecessors, sought to count and register the entire "coloured" population of the country. With the elections for a Constituent Assembly in the offing the government was concerned that a large group of "coloured" foreigners, who had not "properly" adopted the customs or laws of the country, would vote. Government ministers worried openly about the "grave political problem" presented by these people who would commit "irregular acts" at election time. A definition of "irregular acts" was not given, but in the context of post-civil war Costa Rica where thousands were persecuted for their participation in the political process, West Indians had to fear being singled out as a problem.

A few members of the West Indian community were eligible voters and some had participated in previous elections. An increase in West Indian participation occurred during the decade before the civil war as more and more West Indians opted for citizenship and, thereby, became eligible to vote. Calderón and his successor courted many sectors of the population at one time or another and an appeal had been made to the West Indian community for support. One informant mentioned playing an active role in encouraging West Indians to become citizens in order to vote for Rafael Calderón in the 1940 presidential election. He indicated that he had been approached to help bring about changes that would lead to the increased participation of Afro-Costa Ricans in national affairs. As a result, a small number of West Indian votes went to Calderón in 1940. By 1950, several thousand members of the community were entitled to vote and they could make a difference in the province of Limón.

The December 1948 elections for a Constituent Assembly were held under the supervision of the Junta Fundadora in order to legitimatize the political changes being planned. Figueres's party, the PSD, won only four seats in the Constituent Assembly, while Ulate's Partido de Unión Nacional won thirty-four. The victory was marred by the fact that a large percentage of people stayed home on election day. The Atlantic Post reported that sixty-five thousand people or about half the eligible voters in the country did not show up at the polls. The newspaper, in a wry expression of concern, asked rhetorically if the people who had not voted might actually have been casting their ballots for a party that was not allowed to participate in the elections. The massive abstention from the political process so concerned the government that a special commission was established to look into the causes.

The Constituent Assembly was intended to be a legal body whose task was to resolve political problems and overcome the social impasses created by the civil war. The assembly's actions were partisan, therefore, it upheld Otilio Ulate's claim to the presidency in 1948 and nullified the results of the congressional elections that were held at the same time as the presidential election. The reason for the nullification was that the congressional elections of 1948 Calderón's party won a majority of seats in Congress. New congressional elections were planned by the Constituent Assembly, but the chief opposition parties were banned from participating and their leaders were in exile. A favourable majority in Congress was needed by the new government in order to eradicate Calderón's political power and push through new legislation.

At the government level, social democracy became institutionalized as the basis for a new Costa Rica. Social democracy in the Costa Rican context meant that the government became the guarantor of prosperity within a free enterprise system. The object was to create an atmosphere for the rise of a middle class comprising professionals, small business owners and bureaucrats. The junta did not attempt to reverse the progressive reforms made by the two previous administrations. Instead, the new government sought to contain the reforms and introduce new policies that steered clear of radical solutions to the country's ills. The state would play a bigger role in the economy and maintain social programs, but capitalism would prevail. The junta imposed a 10 percent tax on capital and nationalized the banking industry to gain more control over the economy. Along with the extension of progressive legislation the new government also worked to unite Costa Rica in the wake of the civil war.

The new leaders of the country had to worry about the legitimacy of their government. Astute politicians, they knew that in order to have a democratic system of government and to assure their continued grip on power, they had to expand their political base. The distinctions that developed in the past between classes, religions, regions and minorities were down played while nationalism was stressed.

West Indians represented a small but potentially important section of the electorate. Figueres and his followers were not alone in their desire to include West Indians in the political process because the community itself was becoming more openly involved in national politics. The community wanted to see some fundamental changes in the way people of African descent were treated in Costa Rica and members saw their best chance in José Figueres. Within the community citizenship was still an important issue after the civil war, but the 1934 contract clause was seen as the greatest obstacle to people of African descent living in Costa Rica.

The community's chief spokesperson on the matter was Alex Curling Delisser who mounted an attack on the discriminatory article in the contract. For years Curling urged Costa Rican-born West Indians to exercise their right to citizenship in order to build a more secure future for themselves. He supported Ulate in the 1948 elections and became the most outspoken critic of discriminatory legislation after the civil war. During the post-1948 period Alex Curling made his appearance in Costa Rican politics. In 1949 and 1950, he was the author of several public appeals for the rights of "coloured Costa Ricans." Curling did not raise new issues or make radical suggestions but he did point out that there could be no lasting social revolution unless the rights of the largest minority group in the country were protected. West Indians needed a chance to integrate into Costa Rican society and Curling saw the civil war as a golden opportunity. To a certain extent he was right because the eyes of the world were on Costa Rica and because the civil war created a more tolerant social climate. The victors needed to build support because they ousted a popular leader and political coalition from power. However, the political stalemate between José Figueres and Otilio Ulate meant that West Indian concerns could not be dealt with decisively.

As a result, Curling began a press campaign in 1949 and was credited with drawing the junta's attention to the continued existence of the discriminatory clause in the 1934 contract. His first letters reflected his position as a Costa-Rican-born West Indian who opted for citizenship. He argued that the rights of people like him were violated by the 1934 clause despite the fact that he was as patriotic as anyone else. His most forceful attack came just a few months before Figueres conceded the presidential candidacy to Ulate. In June 1949, Curling wrote to the United Nations' League for the Defense of Human Rights to protest against the discrimination West Indians faced in Costa Rica. To pressure the government, the Diario de Costa Rica was sent a copy of his letter. The letter was not the kind of publicity Costa Rican politicians wanted. Curling appealed for the League's protection so that people of African descent in Costa Rica could enjoy more "justice and freedom."

The government responded to Curling's appeal by repealing the discriminatory provisions of the 1934 contract prior to Otilio Ulate's inauguration. Article 5 of the 1934 contract was partially rescinded on 4 November, 1949, by Decree 836. The new legislation was a curious and cautious proposition. It reflected the position of West Indians like Alex Curling, but did not eliminate discrimination against all "coloured people" because it was specifically aimed at those who were Costa Rican citizens. Only those people who could prove they were citizens were to be allowed immediate access to employment on the Pacific coast. All others remained subject to the provisions of the 1934 contract.

Moreover, the decree established yet another commission to look at the documentation of all West Indians. Its task was to establish a register of "coloured people" in the country. Thus, the decree was a compromise measure that protected Costa Rican citizens but allowed Otilio Ulate flexibility in dealing with the West Indian community. Alex Curling's interests were protected and his desire to get reluctant members of his community to integrate were furthered by the new legislation. However, while Alex Curling's concerns were addressed by Figueres, other people's concerns were not.

On 8 November, just four days after Decree 836 was passed, Otilio Ulate assumed his official duties as President. Ulate had a long career as a newspaper publisher and politician. He maintained a generally hostile attitude toward the United Fruit Company and, by extension, the West Indian community. Consequently, on the same day that Ulate took office, La Nación reported that the authorities on the Pacific coast had been instructed to verify the status of all "coloured elements who arrived in the region." In addition, they were asked to record their encounters with West Indians in order to find out how many were moving to the banana zone in search of work. Ironically, in the same edition of La Nación was a letter from Alex Curling who reaffirmed his faith in the "Christian and democratic spirit" of Costa Rica. While Curling was commenting on the change in the law regarding the 1934 banana contract and expressing his support for the new government, Otilio Ulate was once again scrutinizing people of African descent.

Alex Curling also sent a similar letter to the newspaper in Limón where it was published in Spanish one week and translated into English the next. The message was aimed first at community members who could read Spanish. They were the people in the community who most could benefit from the new political alignment in Costa Rica and who were most likely to support Curling's position. The West Indians who spoke only English were still numerous in Limón but their concerns were not those of the new community élite.

Curling and other members of the Afro-Costa Rican élite continued to urge people who had not yet obtained Costa Rican citizenship to do so. They knew that the government intended once again to count and identify the entire West Indian community. Everyone knew that more security was afforded those who gave up their West Indian identity and became Costa Rican. Experience showed that tighter regulations and more discrimination were likely to be on their way. Moreover, Otilio Ulate was in power until 1953 and he was not a friend of the community.

The new president maintained the pressure on the West Indian community throughout his term in office and he was assisted by United Fruit and members of the public. For example, in February 1950 the United Fruit Company instructed all division managers to hire Costa Ricans before foreigners. The fruit company's introduction of the new hiring policy set the pace for the further integration of the West Indian community into the Hispanic mainstream. Again, the leaders of the West Indian community fell in line with the company's policy by urging people born in the country to become citizens and by offering to help them through the bureaucratic maze if necessary. No one was willing to mount a defence of the undocumented and unprotected members of the West Indian community. Many West Indians still depended on the company for their existence in Limón and the partial cancellation of the hiring clause of the 1934 contract meant new opportunities for those who had become Afro-Costa Rican. The value of banana production to the country's economy remained important and people of African descent wanted to enjoy the benefits once again.

In addition to the new policy at United Fruit, members of the West Indian community who were not citizens faced other pressures to conform. By coincidence or design, the Costa Rican government imposed a new tax on community members at the same time that United Fruit introduced its new hiring policy. In February 1950, Ulate's government imposed a sliding scale of taxation on foreigners who lived in the country. The tax was applied to the annual renewal of the residential certificates and failure to comply with the new requirement could mean expulsion from the country. The only exceptions were supposed to be people who came from countries that did not charge Costa Ricans a similar fee for residency. British subjects should all have been exempt from the tax because Britain did not charge Costa Ricans for living under its jurisdiction. However, the tax was charged to British subjects if they were of African descent and the British authorities did not defend the West Indian community.

By the late 1940s the West Indian community was forced to defend its own interests because neither United Fruit nor the British government was interested in its plight. The issue of the tax on residential certificates was brought up by Alex Curling and leaders of the West Indian community but the government ignored their protests. The new regulations for residential certificates meant that British subjects who were of African descent had to pay the maximum amount of fifty colones for renewal. It also meant that West Indians who were born in the country but not opted for citizenship were taxed.

While there were some West Indians who could afford the residential certificates, the price was beyond the means of most. By 1950, Limón's economy was in a shambles and fifty colones was a considerable sum for subsistence farmers and the labouring poor. For example, in 1952, fifty colones could buy a pair of shoes, two shirts and a pair of denim pants at a United Fruit Company commissary in Limón. If, as was common, there was more than one adult living in a home, the annual residential tax would have been an extreme hardship. The alternative to paying the tax was to become a citizen, but in order to apply for an option the residential certificate was required. The Atlantic Post argued that the fifty colones charged for the residential certificate meant that the cost to opt for citizenship was one hundred colones or more. Applicants had to pay for a residential certificate, supply photos, purchase legal application forms and incur other costs. A person could easily spend several months' income to apply to become citizens and those who could least afford to pay the tax were women, children and all others who were economically disadvantaged.

Obstacles also existed for the Costa-Rican-born children of foreigners even though they had a constitutional right to opt for citizenship. They, too, required residential certificates because they were not Costa Rican citizens. Moreover, in April 1949 Alex Curling complained that West Indians often had difficulties obtaining citizenship because their applications were becoming "moth-eaten" in government offices. According to Curling, government officials were letting the applications from West Indians collect dust while others were rapidly processed. The result was that residential certificates had to be renewed during the course of the application and applicants were not sure if the money they had invested would get them citizenship.

The issue of the residential certificates faded away when the government set a final deadline for West Indians who were born in the country to opt for citizenship. The 1949 Constitution was modelled on that of 1871; it, therefore, kept the existing legislation on options for citizenship. However, the government included an article that was designed to eliminate the complications presented by older individuals who were eligible for citizenship. The article re-imposed the limitations established by the Picado administration in 1944. Consequently, people who were over the age of twenty-five were only allowed to apply for an option for a specified period of time. In early November 1954 the period expired. Since the restriction was the same as the Picado government had imposed in 1944, the new limitation received the same reception from the leaders of the West Indian community. It was welcomed as an opportunity and not seen as another attempt to impose Costa Rican authority on West Indians in Limón.

By the time the tax on residential certificates was introduced, community spokesman Alex Curling was in a good position to fight for the rights of non-citizens. He had lobbied the government and published several letters insisting on equal rights for people of African descent. Curling was also being promoted by his peers as a political representative of the Afro-Costa Rican community. According to one author, a group called the Black Whiz wrote to the three leading parties prior to the 1953 elections and asked to be permitted to participate. The fact that the Black Whiz was willing to affiliate itself with any of the leading parties attests to its political pragmatism. It was turned down by Ulate's PUN and Calderón's Republicano Nacional parties but accepted by Figueres's Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN). Only the PLN saw the benefits of allowing Afro-Costa Ricans into its organization.

Afro-Costa Rican votes were desirable since Figueres's popularity diminished while the Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República governed. The failure of his party to contest elections successfully for the Constituent Assembly and Congress forced him to attempt to regain the popular support he had enjoyed in mid-1948. In October 1951 Figueres established the PLN to replace the PSD and began to reconstruct his political power base. The PLN's desire to overcome previous electoral defeats paved the way for Afro-Costa Rican involvement in national politics.

The West Indian community and its political aspirants did not have to worry about presenting their concerns to the parties vying for power because Figueres came to them. Figueres joined West Indian leaders in an appeal to the community to conform. According to one source, he travelled throughout Limón "speaking English, kissing babies and dancing with black women." As a result of his desire to obtain support from voters in Limón, Figueres did things that no other national leader had done before. José Figueres brought conciliation and modern politics to the province, but he did not relax the government's efforts to integrate the West Indian residents of the country.

Figueres won the presidential elections of 1953 and his party obtained thirty-one of forty-five seats in Congress. A significant part of his support came from Costa Ricans who felt that they could contribute to the development of a new political culture in the country. The middle class, not the traditional oligarchy, were the power brokers in the PLN. As such they were more sympathetic to the concerns of the working class and the peasantry. Figueres and the people who formed the leadership of the PLN knew that their fortunes depended on a broad base of support among marginalized sectors of society.

In addition to broadening the electoral base by lowering the voting age to 20, Figueres had also extended the franchise to women and the West Indian community in the aftermath of the civil war. As a result of Figueres's efforts, women went to the polls for the first time in 1953. The New York Times reported that 70 percent of eligible women voted in the election. Similarly, although the turn-out of the West Indian electorate has not been quantified, the significance of their participation in the process obvious. Alex Curling and Stanley Britton became the first Costa Rican-born West Indians to assume elected office in the country. Curling was elected as a supplementary Deputy to Congress while Britton was elected at the municipal level. Women and the West Indian community were finally given voices in electoral politics and they voted for the man who gave them the right to participate.

The accomplishments of Curling and Britton have always been considered as the first step toward the full participation of the West Indian community in Costa Rican politics, but, in truth, their election to office marked the culmination of a protracted struggle for recognition. For years younger members of the community attempted to integrate into mainstream Hispanic society. By 1950, over two thousand had opted for Costa Rican citizenship because they wanted to belong to something other than an isolated West Indian community. Their desire to belong ended the isolation of the West Indian community and created the first generation of Afro-Costa Ricans. Alex Curling was one of them and he had long been an advocate of integration into Hispanic society. As a politician, Curling had to depend on people from his community who were eligible to vote. Therefore, he continued to push people to become Costa Ricans because the West Indian electorate was his.

As a consequence of Curling's efforts, most of the community embraced José Figueres and the Partido Liberación Nacional in the decades that followed the civil war. Charles Koch has noted that the "successors to Calderón and Picado receive[d] few votes from Negro villages." Informants consistently alluded to the debt they owed Figueres and a 1965 study showed support for the PLN to be at 75 percent among Afro-Costa Rican voters. There was, however, an ethnic division among voters in Limón. In the 1953 elections Figueres and the PLN received their lowest levels of support in the banana zones of the province where the Hispanic voters were concentrated. Although ethnicity continued to play a significant role in the lives of the residents of Limón, but people of African descent were finally given a voice in national politics.

Afro-Costa Ricans claimed a victory for people of African descent even though they had lost ground during two decades of relentless attacks by various governments. The community's West Indian identity had diminished in importance as a result of the integration and emigration of its members. Figueres was able to take advantage of the legacy of discriminatory policies to win the support of the community in 1948. In the same way that the enfranchisement of women in 1949 was the inevitable outcome of a struggle for social justice, Figueres became the first president to recognize the strong desire of some West Indians to be accepted as Costa Ricans. However, like the extension of voting rights to women, the recognition of Afro-Costa Ricans as part of the family was just the first step in an as yet incomplete process of creating social equality. They may have rejoiced in the post-civil war atmosphere of conciliation, but Afro-Costa Ricans were still a long way from being accorded recognition for their historic contribution to the development of the nation.

Policies aimed at integration prevailed as the children of West Indian immigrants attended public schools in increasing numbers. Between 1954 and 1958, forty-seven new schools were built in the province of Limón. Education facilities that were built by the government soon replaced the autonomous West-Indian-run schools. After a decade of the new policies, the first significant numbers of university-educated Afro-Costa Rican professionals graduated and began taking up white collar positions in society. For those who could move to San José to take advantage of educational and employment opportunities, life in Costa Rica seemed secure. However, the majority of West Indians continued to live in Limón were they remained isolated from the rest of the country. The significance of their contributions to the country continued to be ignored after 1948 because as a minority group they could be overlooked by the mainstream. Therefore, despite the achievements of the first generation of Afro-Costa Ricans, the West Indian community remained a footnote in Costa Rican history and a forgotten part of the national heritage.


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Copyright Ronald N. Harpelle
Last revised: January 31, 2001